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Resumen
En el cap´ıtulo I se presenta el estado actual de la literatura bancaria y se plantean
los principales problemas au´n no resueltos y que se investigara´n en los siguientes
cap´ıtulos. En el cap´ıtulo II se analiza el rol de la informacio´n y de las diferentes
estructuras del sistema bancario en la generacio´n de pa´nicos y sus posibles efec-
tos sobre el resto del sistema bancario a trave´s del contagio. Se presentan posibles
medidas para prevenirlos como la utilizacio´n de las l´ıneas de cre´dito contingente.
El cap´ıtulo III analiza el rol de los grandes depositantes, aquellos con ma´s incen-
tivos a monitorear la actividad bancaria, en la prevencio´n de posibles problemas de
riesgo moral de los banqueros. Por u´ltimo, en el cap´ıtulo IV, se plantean algunos
inconvenientes que puede generar aumentar los impuestos cuando la economı´a entra
en recesio´n, como son las crisis bancarias. Tambie´n se estudian distintas medidas
para prevenir tales crisis como la reduccio´n del gasto pu´blico o la postergacio´n de
la recaudacio´n impositiva.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Banking crises are costly and quite frequent events which can spread to banks and
regions all around the world. During the last twenty five years, more than two thirds
of the IMF countries have suffered some kind of financial troubles, a fact which has
called attention of researchers (see Lindgren, Garcia and Saal, 1996). However,
the exact nature of the transmission mechanism and the best ways to diminish the
impact of the crises are still unresolved.
It has been estimated that the recent bankruptcies in Thailand, Indonesia, South
Korea and Japan had an approximate cost of one hundred thousand million of
dollars for the IMF (see Beim and Calomiris, 2001). These crises, together with the
ones suffered in Scandinavia at the beginning of the nineties and in Latin America
(Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela) at the end of the XX century, stimulated
a vast literature on bank runs and contagion. Nevertheless, the literature on financial
contagion through the banking sector is newer and less developed, although it is not
a new phenomenon.
In these papers, the term “contagion” will refer to the transmission of an id-
iosyncratic shock that affects one bank or possibly a group of banks, and how this
shock is transmitted to other banks or banking sectors. This notion of contagion is
part of the broader concept of systemic risk , which may result from contagion or a
13
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common shock affecting all banks simultaneously.
Banking crises have shed light on the fact that the financial system, and espe-
cially the banking sector, not only can amplify and transfer problems originated in
one sector of the economy, but can also be a main driver of such crisis. Another
important fact is that banking problems are difficult to eradicate and they may
survive once the economies are recovered. This phenomenon is stimulated by the
high capital mobility and open financial systems. While emergent economies usu-
ally benefit from such inflows when the system is at rest, it is at the cost of higher
vulnerability during the crisis.
Prudential regulation in the form of liquidity or capital requirements are designed
to enhance the resilience to shocks of financial systems by requiring institutions to
maintain prudent levels of liquidity and capital under a broad range of market
conditions. However, at times of market turbulence the remedial actions prescribed
by these regulations may have perverse effects on systemic stability. Forced sales of
assets may feed back on market volatility and produce a downward spiral in asset
prices, which in turn may affect adversely other financial institutions (Cifuentes,
Ferrucci and Shin, 2005). The aim of this introduction is to revise the existing
literature on financial crises and, more specifically, in the financial contagion issue
and to provide the background for the rest of the dissertation.
1.2 Banking Crises
We should not start analyzing contagion without discussing the existing literature
on banking panics. Given the historical importance of banking crises remarked
by the recent episodes around the world, a huge literature has emerged trying to
analyze the causes of its occurrence, and the best policies to prevent and remove its
effects. Although there is lot of controversy concerning the causes of global banking
crises, there exists now some consensus concerning the main source of fragility for
individual banks: the fractional reserve system, under which long term, illiquid,
loans or investments are financed by deposits on demand.
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1.2.1 Bank Runs
There are two views in the theoretical literature: one is the pure panic view pioneered
by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The other is the information based view where bank
runs are triggered by information asymmetries and uncertain returns.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) formalize the idea of the demand for liquidity, which
was previously introduced by Bryant (1980), and analyze bank runs as a coordination
problem among depositors, even in the presence of safe assets. The service that
allows better risk sharing among people with different consumption horizons (and
provides the rationale for the existence of banks), makes banks vulnerable to runs.
Whenever a large fraction of depositors decide to withdraw, it is individually
rational for others to do the same, thus provoking an inefficient bank run. This will
happen when the bank under attack is forced to liquidate prematurely its assets.
In the absence of aggregate uncertainty, suspension of convertibility can impede the
bank run equilibrium, while under other circumstances deposit insurance would be
preferred.1
The alternative view stresses problems of uncertainty and asymmetric informa-
tion about banks’ financial conditions as the source of bank runs. Chari and Jagan-
nathan (1988) argue that runs occur when some individuals receive a signal about
bank’s return which may lead them to withdraw funds early. Others must then try
to deduce from observed behavior whether an unfavorable signal was received by
this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high. Here, both information
induced and pure panic runs occur because uninformed depositors misinterpret liq-
uidity shocks as bad news about the condition of bank assets. Hence, a public policy
should aim at reducing informational asymmetries.
Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) consider the choice between deposit and equity
contracts in an environment where some agents receive superior information about
future expected return, while Green and Lin (2003) and Peck and Shell (2003)
analyze more flexible theoretical contracts that allow the bank to condition the
payment to each depositor on the number of agents who claimed early withdrawal
before her.
1Gorton (1988) provides several critics to this model, namely, that bank runs are not “pure
random”.
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In this environment they obtain different results, while Green and Lin show that
the mechanism that supports the constrained-efficient allocation does not permit a
bank-run equilibrium, Peck and Shell provide examples where bank runs can occur
in equilibrium under the optimal deposit contract, if the bank run is triggered by
sunspots.
Cooper and Ross (2002) argue that deposit insurance alone will not provide
adequate incentives for depositors, they will not monitor banks, and consequently
banks will invest in excessively risky projects. However, the requirement that banks
put up a minimum amount of their capital, along with full deposit insurance, can
restore the first-best allocation.
Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) analyze the conditions under which banks increase
welfare overall, and construct a demand-deposit contract that trades off the benefits
from liquidity against the costs of runs, while Samart´ın (2003) provides a model
where, in the presence of risky assets and aggregate uncertainty, some individuals
are better informed about bank’s asset quality. She shows that although it is optimal
for the bank to prevent runs, in some situations the bank run allocation is welfare
superior.
In a recent paper, Chen and Hasan (2006) use a simple model to answer whether
greater information transparency always increases bank safety and improves deposi-
tor welfare. They find that greater informational transparency may reduce depositor
welfare by increasing the chance of an inefficient bank run. Building in their model
but introducing a government who raises taxes so as to provide public services, chap-
ter IV shows that a government might be responsible of a banking crisis. This is
due to the fact that the government has to compete with the private sector for those
funds. Then, during a recession, banks will find it difficult to get enough liquidity.
The literature on banks and bank runs that emerged from the Diamond and
Dybvig model is vast, and cannot be fully covered here. We refer the interested
reader to an excellent recent survey by Gorton and Winton (2003).
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1.3 Contagion through the Banking System
Linkages among agents in financial markets are a concern because of the risk of
financial contagion, that is, the risk that a small shock to one agent will propagate
to other agents in a domino effect. This effect occurs if the failure of one financial
institution to settle payment obligations triggers a chain reaction that threatens the
stability of the whole financial system.
The literature identifies three main channels for financial contagion: The asset
market channel, the banking channel, and the currency channel. We will focus our
attention on the banking channel. This line of research seeks to extend the seminal2
contribution of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) from a run in one bank to a collapse
of the entire banking system, and they attribute such imperfection in the interbank
market to either information asymmetry or limited availability of liquidity.
1.3.1 Theoretical Literature
Antecedents
An interesting antecedent of this literature can be found in Bhattacharya and Gale
(1985). They consider many intermediaries, each one having private information
only about the proportion of the population that will withdraw from it at the inter-
mediate date. They show that there are welfare gains from setting up institutions
such as a central bank or, at any rate, a market for intermediaries to trade in the
interim period.
An additional concern of the interbank market is its role in settlement of pay-
ments. The maintenance of deposit balances with other banks facilitates the clearing
of payments across the banking system. Rochet and Tirole (1996) analyze the ef-
fects of interbank lending in generating systemic risk, since banks do not collateralize
their exposition to other banks’ risk in the interbank market. A natural consequence
is the spillover of a crisis in one bank to the whole banking system (domino effect).
Interbank credit lines reduce the costs of maintaining reserves at the expense of
2For a deeper analysis of the different channels for financial contagion see Kaminsky, Reinhart
and Vegh (2003) and Pritsker (2000).
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exposing the system to coordination failures, even if all banks are solvent (Freixas,
Parigi and Rochet 2000).
Payoff and information externalities might be important in causing inefficient
bank runs and contagion. When depositors are differently informed, uniformed
depositors have incentives to respond to different sources of information before the
value of the bank’s assets is revealed. Chen (1999) proposes an incentive-compatible
reform of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that can make bank
runs an efficient mechanism to discipline banks.
New literature on Contagion
Interbank exposures may lead to domino effects, where the failure of a bank results
in the failure of other banks even if the latter are not directly affected by the initial
shock. The recent literature has shown that this risk of contagion depends on the
structure of the interbank network.
There exist at least two explanations for the rationality of contagion. The first
one is an informational one, where the adverse information that precipitates a crisis
in one institution also implies adverse information about the other. This view em-
phasizes correlations in the underlying values across institutions and Bayes learning
by rational agents (Chen, 1999).
The second explanation deals with the fact that financial institutions are often
linked to each other through direct portfolio or balance sheet connections. Although
such linkages may be desirable ex-ante, during a crisis, such balance sheet connec-
tions may cause the failure of one institution to spill-over on others by contagion.
Concentrating upon the direct effects of increased risk of default; Allen and Gale
(2000) introduce contagion as an equilibrium phenomenon. Banks maintain inter-
bank deposits to insure against imperfectly correlated liquidity shocks, but make
them fragile against an “improbable” liquidity preference shock. In such context,
the “incompleteness” of the interbank claims will determine the possibility of con-
tagion.
Interbank market claims are said to be “complete” when banks are allowed to
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maintain deposits in all the other banks in every region.3 From such extreme case, we
have many other possibilities where banks are somehow restricted in their possibility
to keep deposits in other banks. The intuition is that banks may specialize in
particular areas of business or have closer connections with banks that operate in
the same geographical or political unit.
Nevertheless, Allen and Gale do not consider the possibility that the change in
depositors behavior might be due to bad news about the evolution of banks portfolio
performance and an incomplete market structure of banks.
Allen and Gale’s analysis assumes a pecking order for asset liquidation, where
short assets are sold before interbank deposits, and interbank deposits before long-
term assets. In a paper that changes the pecking order condition, Saez and Shi
(2004) show that when a bank becomes bankrupt and the liquidity gap is small,
banks holding deposits on the disturbed bank may liquidate their own long assets
before liquidating the deposits on the disturbed bank. By doing so, the safe bank can
transfer liquidity to the illiquid bank in order to insure later consumers its deposits
and impede systemic illiquidity and contagion. They also introduce the concept
of liquidity pool, a claim structure where banks are indirectly connected, which
guarantees liquidity in the presence of an insolvent bank and impedes contagion.
In chapter II it is shown that in order to facilitate the use of the interbank market
under incomplete markets, some kind of coordination might be needed. Usually, the
Central Bank is the one assuming such a role.
Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) analyze a model where different regions are
subject to different levels of moral hazard, and have negatively correlated liquidity
needs. Integrated financial markets increase expected social welfare, but only at the
cost of greater financial instability. Consequently, and contrary to Allen and Gale
finding, contagion is greater the more interconnected banks are. In chapter II it
is shown that similar results are obtained when banks use the interbank market to
protect themselves against technological shocks, and not only for liquidity reasons.
In chapter III, it is shown that in the presence of a partial deposit insurance, big
depositors (those whose deposits are not full insured) have incentives to monitor
banks’ activity. Moreover, the existence of such depositors would prevent bankers
3A region is a spatial metaphor that can be interpreted in several ways. It can correspond to
a single bank, a geographical region within a country, a country or a specialized sector within the
banking industry.
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from investing in high risk investments.
The intuition behind this idea is that in an incomplete structure, contagion is
going to be limited to the two adjacent banks, while in a complete structure, con-
tagion will spill-over to all the regions that have suffered the same type of shock in
the first period. However, the loss of each region in a complete structure is smaller.
Babus (2006) arrives to the opposite conclusion while considering the optimal net-
work structure (her results coincide with the ones of Allen and Gale, 2000). Again,
the problem is that there is a trade-off between high losses for a small number of
banks (Brusco and Castiglionesi) and small losses for all banks (Babus). However,
although the results of Babus are consistent if the failure of a bank occurs in the
first period, they are not robust to the failure of the bank occurring in the second
period.
In the same line of research, there is the paper by Aghion, Bolton and Dewa-
tripont (2000), that considers the case of a private clearinghouse arrangement as a
way to reduce individual banks’ insolvency. They conclude that in such environ-
ment, a private banking system may not be immune to contagious bank runs, since
there is a trade-off between reducing the potential insolvency of individual banks
and keeping contagious runs away.
Castiglionesi (2007) analyzes another solution to prevent contagion, when it is
due to an unexpected liquidity shortage. In his model, the Central Bank’s problem
is to choose the optimal level of reserves that ensures enough liquidity in the bad
state of nature minimizing its impact on profitable activities. The problem of this
model is that it assumes differently informed agents, where banks and individuals
share their “ignorance”; the Central Bank has more information about changes in
individual preferences. Chapter II of the thesis analyzes how a Central Bank can
prevent contagion, using a contingent credit line procedure and without assuming
that this institution has superior information.
Leitner (2005), suggests that once the crisis appears banks may be willing to bail
out those banks in trouble. The difference with respect to chapter II of the thesis
is that in Leitner, the threat of contagion is part of the optimal network design,
while in this thesis it is a cost that banks have to bear in order to save on liquidity
provisions during good times.
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1.4 Three Essays on Banking Crises
Historical events have shown that there is still a lot of work to be done in order to
decrease, or at least alleviate the effects of systemic risk. When calm seems to be
the rule, a new crisis appears sometimes as a result of “magic” events while other
times as the consequence of an accumulation of factors.
Since banks constitute a pillar of the economic system in their activity of cap-
turing funds and transforming them into investment, the threat that a problem at
a single bank might spread to the whole financial system, sometimes across the
borders, has called the attention of researchers in the incipient literature on “conta-
gion”. In the following chapters, three theoretical papers are presented that attempt
to give some new insights on how banking problems appear and how they can spread
to other banks and regions.
The next two chapters of this dissertation will be devoted to the phenomenon
of contagion. Chapter II incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of information
a` la Nikitin and Smith (2008), in a framework similar to Allen and Gale (2000),
without relying on any unexpected shock to model contagion. In this framework,
contagion and financial crises are the result of information gathering by depositors,
weak fundamentals and an incomplete market structure of banks. It also shows how
financial systems entering a recession can affect others with apparently stronger
economic conditions (contagion). Finally, this is the first paper to investigate the
effectiveness of the Contingent Credit Line procedures, introduced by the IMF at
the end of the nineties, as a mechanism to prevent the propagation of crises.
Chapter III incorporates differently informed agents in the model of Brusco and
Castiglionesi (2007). It is shown that the monitoring activity by informed depositors
might generate a bank run if those depositors can anticipate the appearance of
moral hazard problems by banks. The results of the paper suggest that a fractional
deposit insurance system can be an optimal instrument to promote market discipline.
Moreover, contagion is a very rare event.
Finally, Chapter IV analyses the impact that taxes have on the emergence of
financial crises. The accuracy of different policies to prevent banking crises (such
as reducing the public budget and taxes, or postponing their collection via taxes
on financial transactions) is also analyzed. A key finding of this paper is that
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even though the government is usually an expected-utility maximizer, it might be
responsible for the emergence of banking sector problems since raising taxes reduces
the availability of funds for private investments. However, it is shown that consumers
might prefer a banking crisis when consuming public services is important enough
for them. Finally, a government may face a commitment problem if avoiding crises
implies going against its principles, like reducing the provision of public services.
This is the first paper that analyzes bank runs due to the presence of taxes so as to
provide public services in a closed economy with banks. Moreover, the effectiveness
of taxes on financial transactions, which have extensively been used in emerging
markets, is investigated.
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26 General Introduction
Chapter 2
Information Acquisition and
Financial Contagion
“We are giving countries a greater financial incentive to adopt crisis-
resistant policies by offering those that do Contingent Credit Lines to
protect them from contagion effects”
Stanley Fisher, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF (1994 -
2001), Policy Issues Forum, Washington DC, april 28, 2001.
2.1 Introduction
Financial crises are costly and frequent events. During the last twenty five years,
more than two thirds of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) member countries
have suffered some kind of financial troubles (see Lindgren, Garcia and Saal, 1996
and Beim and Calomiris, 2001).
These financial crises reflect the fact that the financial system, and especially
the banking sector, not only can amplify and transfer problems originated in other
sectors of the economy, but can also be a main driver of such crises (for example, the
financial crises of Mexico 1994, Korea 1997 and Turkey 2000 had the banking sector
weaknesses at the core). Financial institutions are often linked to each other through
direct portfolio or capital connections that are desirable ex-ante, but during a crisis
the failure of one institution can have direct negative effects on the other institutions
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linked to it (see Rochet and Tirole, 1996; Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripoint, 2000;
Freixas and Parigi, 1998; Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 2000; Allen and Gale, 2000).
This paper provides a novel view on the interplay of sunspots and fundamentals in
the development of financial crises. In particular, it does not rely on any unexpected
shock to model contagion. It also shows how financial systems entering a recession
can affect others with apparently stronger economic conditions (contagion). Finally,
this is the first paper to investigate the effectiveness of the Contingent Credit Line
procedures, introduced by the IMF at the end of the nineties, as a mechanism to
prevent the propagation of crises.
In the present paper, contagion and financial crises are the result of information
gathering by depositors and an incomplete market structure of banks. We model
a four region economy, where the representative bank of each region has access to
an illiquid long term investment project that allows depositors to increase their
expected welfare. Half of the banks are going to receive a low return on their in-
vestment and will be called “bad banks”, the other half will receive a high return
on their projects and will be called “good banks”. Additionally, banks will main-
tain interbank linkages to reduce aggregate uncertainty. Nevertheless, full linkages
among banks are not always possible and sometimes unstable structures are set and
contagion may occur.
We present three different banking market structures. First, a market where
all banks maintain interbank linkages (complete market structure). Second, the
neighboring case, where banks are just financially connected to their neighbors but
indirectly to all the others. Finally, the island case, where each bank keeps linkages
with only one bank. We will show that in the complete market structure the first best
allocation is achieved. In the neighboring case, different equilibria are possible: a
verification equilibrium with partial runs (with and without contagion), a verification
equilibrium with total runs, a full-run equilibrium and a no-run equilibrium.
In the verification equilibria depositors gather information and penalize ineffi-
cient banks. In one of those equilibria, bank runs only take place in bad banks
(partial bank runs), although other banks might be affected as well (contagion). In
the second equilibrium, there is a global withdrawal from the banking system in a
contagious fashion. There is also a full-run equilibrium, where depositors do not
gather information but withdraw in a pure panic way, and one, characterized by
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no runs and no information gathering. In the island case three different equilibria
are possible: the verification equilibrium, the full-run equilibrium, and the no-run
equilibrium. In the verification equilibrium, bank runs are partial and there is no
contagion. Nevertheless, the expected utility is higher in the neighboring case than
in the island case.
The equilibria with crises of the model are fundamentals-based and panic-based
at the same time. Bank runs are related to fundamentals, although this does not
mean that bad fundamentals per se cause the run. Investors’ coordination on a
particular equilibrium is triggered by a self-fulfilling prophecy. When the system is
at rest, individuals do not find it optimal to gather information and so the model
explains why there are periods in which individuals do not modify their expectations
on banks. However, if for any reason they decide to invest in information gathering
they would penalize those states of nature in which banks establish inefficient links.
This would cause the liquidation of bad projects, but it might also generate contagion
and financial crises when financial linkages are very inaccurate.
Following, we define the role for a Central Bank as a market completer. The
mechanism we analyze is the one similar to the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) of
the IMF. The idea of the CCL is to provide a precautionary line of defense for
members with sound policies, who are not at risk of an external payments crisis of
their own making, but vulnerable to contagion effects from capital account crisis
in other countries. We show that the CCL is a powerful mechanism to prevent
financial crises in environments characterized by incomplete markets and distrustful
depositors.
The lack of strong evidence of contagious bank failures in the periods in which
the Central Bank played an active role as a lender of last resort does not disprove the
possibility of financial contagion through the banking system. The recent episode
(September 2007) of depositors queuing at the Northern Rock bank in the UK trying
to withdraw their money, has shown that it is possible to have distrustful depositors
even in the presence of deposit insurance, authorities defending the solvency of the
institution and a healthy real economy. Additionally, banks in England and other
countries in Europe1attempting to get more liquidity is a warning of the possibility of
1For example, the Deutsche bank had bought 3,56 percent of Northern Rock, consequently, the
values of its shares were also affected.
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contagion. Our model is an attempt to give some insights into this possibility, and in
explaining that a healthy interbank market is crucial in preventing contagious bank
failures. It is obvious that more work on anticipating and preventing such crises is
needed, and our paper is an attempt to go in such direction.
This paper goes in line with Allen and Gale (2000), Saez and Shi (2004), Leit-
ner (2005) and Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) in the sense that banks maintain
interbank linkages but with the purpose to insure against negatively correlated tech-
nological shocks (fundamentals). The proposed model incorporates voluntary costly
acquisition of information a` la Nikitin and Smith (2007), but in our case individuals
are not allowed to maintain deposits in different banks, although this is done by
banks themselves. This allows us to explain contagion.
As in Allen and Gale (2000), we model contagion as an equilibrium phenomenon.
However, we do not require an unexpected event to model contagion. Banks main-
tain interbank linkages to insure against technological shocks and this makes them
fragile against information acquisition by depositors. In such context, the ”incom-
pleteness” of the interbank claims will determine the possibility of contagion.
Saez and Shi (2004) introduce the concept of a liquidity pool, a claim structure
where banks are indirectly connected, which guarantees liquidity in the presence of
an insolvent bank and impedes contagion. In our case the Central Bank provides
an efficient solution to overcome financial contagion. As in Castiglionesi (2007), the
Central Bank plays the role of a market completer but when the problems are due to
fundamentals and not to liquidity ones. Therefore, the results of the present paper
indicate that those institutions should be free of intervention by local governments
since their objective is to work as a ”market completer” or global insurer avoiding the
usual political restrictions to capital mobility. Such institutions reallocate resources
from developed to underdeveloped economies allowing the system to achieve the first
best allocation.
The work by Leitner (2005), introduced the threat of contagion as part of the
optimal network design. The idea is that when agents are not linked to one another,
agents who have high endowments have no incentive ex-post to help out those who
have low endowments. Thus, some positive net present value investments do not
take place. On the other hand, when agents are linked to one another, agents with
high endowments are willing to bail out those with low endowments, since failure to
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do so leads all projects to fail by contagion. On the contrary, in the present paper,
the linkages appear because banks cannot anticipate the success of their projects,
and therefore the possibility of contagion is a cost that banks have to assume.
The seminal contribution by Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) provides a model
where different regions are subject to different levels of moral hazard, and have neg-
atively correlated liquidity needs. Integrated financial markets increase expected
social welfare, but only at the cost of greater financial instability. As a consequence,
and contrary to Allen and Gale’s finding, contagion is greater the more intercon-
nected banks are. They conclude that banks establish links and accept the risk of
contagion, only when the risk is not too high. In this respect, it is close to our results
for incomplete markets. We find that the more incomplete the banking structure is,
read the island case, the less vulnerable to contagion it is. Nevertheless, depositors
prefer the neighboring case to the island case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the basic model is presented in
section 2. Section 3 describes the social optimal allocation. Section 4, introduces
financial intermediaries (banks), and analyzes different market structures and their
respective equilibria. Sections 5 shows how a Central Bank provides an efficient
solution to overcome financial contagion. Finally, section 6 presents a numerical
example and section 7 concludes.
2.2 The Model
We consider a three date (t = 0, 1, 2) economy and one single good. There are two
types of assets: A liquid asset that takes one unit of the good at date t and converts
it into one unit of the good at date t+ 1 (storage). An illiquid asset that takes one
unit of the good at date 0 and transforms it into RH or RL units of the good at date
2 depending on the state of nature. It is assumed that 0 ≤ RL < 1 < RH and that
the expected return (R = 1
2
RL+ 1
2
RH) is greater than one. If the illiquid technology
is liquidated prematurely at t = 1, we obtain r, with 0 ≤ r < 1.
There are four regions in this economy. Each region consists of a continuum
of ex-ante identical consumers-depositors with an endowment of one unit of the
consumption good at t = 0. They are subject at t = 1 to a privately observed
uninsurable risk of being of either of two types. Type 1 (or impatient) agents derive
only utility from consumption in period one and type 2 (or patient) agents derive
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only utility from consumption in period 2. In addition, type 2 agents can privately
store the good from t = 1 to t = 2. Their utility function is as follows:
U(c1, c2) =
{
u(c1) with probability γ (Type 1)
u(c2) with probability (1− γ) (Type 2)
(2.1)
Where the utility function u(.) is defined over non-negative levels of consump-
tion, is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable, and
satisfies Inada conditions. There is no aggregate uncertainty and so the probability
γ represents the fraction of early consumers in the economy. Consumer’s type is his
private information.
There is also a continuum of identical banks in each region, or a representative
bank in each region. A bank is a financial institution which invests in the technology
on behalf of consumers and provides them with consumption at t = 1 or t = 2. Each
consumer deposits his endowment in the bank at t = 0, and in exchange he receives a
demand deposit contract. Competition among banks forces them to offer a contract
that maximizes the expected utility of the representative consumer. This contract
pays a fixed amount at each date, and in the event that this is not possible all
available funds will be divided pro rata in proportion to claims (as in Allen and
Gale, 1998, we do not assume a sequential service constraint). In particular, the
demand deposit contract gives the depositor the right to withdraw either c1 at t = 1
or c2(R) at t = 2. The second period random return reflects the fact that having
invested in a random technology, the bank may not be able to make its promised
payment at date 2. In this sense the only risk the depositors bear is that they will
not be repaid their money in the situation in which it is physically impossible to
repay them.
It is also assumed that banks in half of the regions will obtain a high return
on their investment project (expansion banks, from now on good banks), and the
other half a low one (recession banks, from now on bad banks). Neither bankers nor
depositors know the type of their own banks nor that of the other ones. Nevertheless,
they know the distribution of shocks in the whole economy. The information is
revealed to consumers-depositors at t = 2, although they can obtain information at
t = 1 at a cost of ε. This information cost can be understood as a monitoring cost.
Although information might be perfect and free, depositors need time and other
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resources to process it.2
Notice that if we consider all banks as a single one there is no aggregate uncer-
tainty concerning technology shocks, since
−
R = 1
2
RL + 1
2
RH . Finally, it is assumed
that depositors cannot deposit in banks in more than one region.
2.3 Social Optimum
The problem of the social planner is to maximize the expected welfare of a rep-
resentative consumer. We will focus on the range of parameters under which the
social planner should never interrupt illiquid technology investment at t = 13 and
even inefficient projects should be completed and resources on verification should
not be spent. The social planner should use storage to provide for consumption of
impatient agents. The planner maximizes:
Max
{x,y,c1,c2}
γu(c1) + (1− γ)u(c2), (2.2)
subject to
x+ y ≤ 1; (2.3)
γc1 ≤ y; (2.4)
(1− γ)c2 ≤ Rx; (2.5)
x ≥ 0; y ≥ 0; c1 ≥ 0; c2 ≥ 0. (2.6)
Where y is the amount invested in storage, x is the amount invested in the illiquid
technology, c1 is the consumption of impatient consumers and c2 the consumption of
patient ones. Equation (2.2) is the expected utility to be maximized. Equation (2.3)
is the date 0 constraint which states that all the resources should be used for storage
or investment and equation (2.4) the first period one. It states that the amount of
storage should be enough to provide for consumption of type 1 consumers. Similarly,
equation (2.5) shows that the consumption of type 2 consumers comes from the
illiquid technology.
2See Nikitin and Smith (2007) for a discussion of this assumption.
3Verification is never socially optimal for values of ε, such that, ε ≥ ε∗ = max{ 12 (r − R
L
R
), 0}.
For a detailed derivation of this result, see Nikitin and Smith (2007).
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Optimality requires that the feasibility constraints are satisfied with equality, so
we can write the problem as
Max
y[0,1]
γu
(
y
γ
)
+ (1− γ)u
(
1− y
1− γR
)
(2.7)
Since u(.) is strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions, the solution to
problem (2.7) is unique and interior. The optimal value y∗(0, 1) is obtained from
the first order condition
u′
(
y∗
γ
)
= Ru′
(
1− y∗
1− γ R
)
(2.8)
and once y∗ has been determined by equation (2.8) we can use the feasibility con-
straints to determine the other variables:
c∗1 =
y∗
γ
, c∗2 =
(1− y∗)
1− γ R, x
∗ = 1− y∗ (2.9)
Notice that (2.8) and (2.9) imply that u′(c∗1) = Ru
′(c∗2), which in turn implies
u′(c∗1) > u
′(c∗2) and c
∗
2 > c
∗
1. Thus, the first-best allocation automatically satisfies
the incentive constraint c2 ≥ c1, that is late consumers have no incentive to behave
as early consumers. We will call Ψ∗ ≡ (y∗, x∗, c∗1, c∗2) the first-best allocation, and
U∗ the expected utility achieved under the first best allocation.
2.4 Decentralized Economy with Banks
Decentralization of the social optimal allocation can be achieved in the same way
as in Allen and Gale (2000). Each bank issues demand deposits contracts. These
deposits pay c∗1 =
y∗
γ
if withdrawn in the first period, provided that the bank is
solvent. In the second period all remaining assets are liquidated and allocated
among deposit holders on a pro rata basis.
Each bank stores y∗ share of the period 0 deposit, and invests the rest in the
illiquid technology. The amount of storage technology should be enough to just
satisfy the liquidity needs of impatient agents. Additionally, banks are going to
establish linkages ex ante, in order to insure against the technology shock. Let zij
be defined as the loan that bank j receives from bank i (by assumption zij = zji).
Given that agents are risk averse, and that the bank type may be revealed only
in period 1, it is optimal that bank i spreads interbank loans for an amount of
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zi = [
n
n+1
] =
∑n+1
j=1,j 6=i zij across the banking system (where n is the number of links
each bank has). This interbank loans pays zijR
Hx if kept until t = 2, when the
bank is of a good type, and zijR
Lx when the bank is of a bad type.4 If liquidated
at t = 1, it will pay the same as other deposits withdrawn in the first period (zijc1).
Recall that the interbank loans are compensated simultaneously between banks, so
if bank 1 decides to cancel its interbank loan at t = 1, it will also have to pay back
its obligation with the other banks in that period.
With four banks there are three types of financial linkages that are symmetrical:
1) the full linked case (complete market structure), 2) the neighboring case, and 3)
the island case (the last two cases are examples of incomplete market structures).5
We assume that the structure of the banking system is known at the very beginning
but not the type of each bank nor that of the depositor.
2.4.1 Complete Market Structure
In the complete market structure (full linked case), each bank is linked to three other
banks and therefore there is only one possible state of nature which is represented
in figure 1.
From now on, G1 and G4 are going to be the good banks and B2 and B3 the bad
banks. A number 1 in the matrix means that there is a linkage between those banks.
In this case, zi =
3
4
and zij =
1
4
. In the presence of full linkages among banks, the
first best equilibrium is achievable.
G1 B2 B3 G4
G1 0 1 1 1
B2 1 0 1 1
B3 1 1 0 1
G4 1 1 1 0
Figure 1: Complete Market Structure
4This structure of interbank loan payments facilitates savings in monitoring costs while profiting
from diversification. It may also be interpreted as banks’ shares in other banks in the system.
5We use symmetrical allocations for simplicity of exposition. However, similar results can be
obtained with non symmetrical linkages.
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The demand deposit contract is obtained as a solution to the following problem:
Max
{x,y,c1,c2}
γu(c1) + (1− γ)[1
2
u(cB2 ) +
1
2
u(cG2 )], (2.10)
subject to
x+ y + zj − zi ≤ 1; (2.11)
γc1 ≤ y; (2.12)
(1− γ)cB2 ≤ [RL(1− zj) +RLzij +RHzij +RHzij]x; (2.13)
(1− γ)cG2 ≤ [RH(1− zj) +RLzij +RLzij +RHzij]x; (2.14)
1
2
u(cB2 ) +
1
2
u(cG2 ) ≥ u(c1); (2.15)
x ≥ 0; y ≥ 0; c1 ≥ 0; cB2 ≥ 0; cG2 ≥ 0; zi = zj =
4∑
j=1,j 6=i
zij; (2.16)
where cG2 represents second period consumption in a good type bank and c
B
2 second
period consumption in a bad type one. zj are total interbank loans received from
other banks in the system and obviously zj = zi =
∑4
j=1,j 6=i zij. Equation (2.10) is
the expected utility to be maximized. Equation (2.11) is the period 0 constraint and
equation (2.12) the first period one. Equations (2.13) and (2.14) correspond to the
second period constrains, in the case of a bad bank and a good bank, respectively.
Given that each bank has an obligation equal to zjR˜ix with the rest of the sys-
tem and at the same time has the right to receive ziR˜jx from the other banks;
the resources available in the second period are given by the return of the projects
minus the obligations with the system plus the right to receive from other banks:
[R˜i − zjR˜i + ziR˜j]x, where R˜i is the expected return from our technology, and R˜j
is the expected return from our neighbors. Finally, equation (2.15) is the incen-
tive compatibility constraint, that guarantees that type 2 depositors do not have
incentives to imitate type 1 depositors.
It is straightforward to see that cB2 = c
G
2 = c2 and [R
L(1− zj) +RLzij +RHzij +
RHzij] = R; and therefore we have the same problem as in the social optimum given
by equations (2.2) to (2.9). Since c∗2 > c
∗
1, each agent has incentives to respect his
type, and the social optimal allocation is attained. It is never optimal for consumers
to spend resources in obtaining information about the type of the bank in the first
period. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 The first best allocation Ψ∗ is attainable in a complete market
structure.
2.4.2 The Neighboring Case
A B
D C
Figure 2: The Neighboring Case
In the neighboring case, banks are financially connected to two other banks in
the system forming a close group. Given political, geographical and/or historical
reasons, some regions like A and C or B and D in figure 2 are not directly connected
although they are indirectly connected through their neighbors.
Bankers and consumers-depositors know this information from the very begin-
ning, although they don’t know in which type of bank they are nor the type of their
neighbor banks (they just know the structure of the game). Nevertheless, depositors
can obtain this information at t = 1 at a cost of ε.
We have three possible states of nature: One case where a good bank is linked
to two bad ones or a bad bank connected to two good ones, figure 3 (a), and two
cases where a good bank is connected to one good bank and one bad one, figures 3
(b) and (c). All states are going to be equally probable, and are represented in the
following matrices:
G1 B2 B3 G4
G1 0 1 1 0
B2 1 0 0 1
B3 1 0 0 1
G4 0 1 1 0
G1 B2 B3 G4
G1 0 1 0 1
B2 1 0 1 0
B3 0 1 0 1
G4 1 0 1 0
G1 B2 B3 G4
G1 0 0 1 1
B2 0 0 1 1
B3 1 1 0 0
G4 1 1 0 0
(a) State I (b) State II (c) State III
Figure 3. States of nature in the Neighboring Case
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However, those three states of nature can be separated into two: that of figure
3(a) with probability 1
3
and those of figure 3(b) and figure 3(c) with probability 2
3
.
In the neighboring case, each bank will maintain total interbank loans of zi =
2
3
and
so zij =
1
3
. Now, consumers-depositors are going to solve the following problem:
Max
{x,y,c1N ,{ct2i}t=1,2i=L,H}
γu(c1N) + (1− γ)
{
1
2
[
1
3
u(c12L) +
2
3
u(c22L)
]
+
1
2
[
1
3
u(c12H) +
2
3
u(c22H)
]}
(2.17)
subject to
x+ y − zi + zj ≤ 1; (2.18)
γc1N ≤ y; (2.19)
(1− γ)c22L ≤
[
RL(1− zj) +RHzij +RLzij
]
x =
[
2
3
RL +
1
3
RH
]
x; (2.20)
(1− γ)c12L ≤
[
RL(1− zj) +RHzij +RHzij
]
x =
[
1
3
RL +
2
3
RH
]
x; (2.21)
(1− γ)c12H ≤
[
RH(1− zj) +RLzij +RLzij
]
x =
[
1
3
RH +
2
3
RL
]
x; (2.22)
(1− γ)c22H ≤
[
RH(1− zj) +RLzij +RHzij
]
x =
[
2
3
RH +
1
3
RL
]
x; (2.23)
1
2
[
1
3
u(c12L) +
2
3
u(c22L)
]
+
1
2
[
1
3
u(c12H) +
2
3
u(c22H)
]
≥ u(c1N); (2.24)
x ≥ 0; y ≥ 0; zi =
∑
j{i−1,i+1}
zij; (2.25)
c1N ≥ 0; c12L ≥ 0; c22L ≥ 0; c12H ≥ 0; c22H ≥ 0; (2.26)
where c1N is the consumption of impatient consumers, c
1
2L (c
1
2H) is the consumption
of a patient depositor in a bad (good) bank in state 1, and c22L (c
2
2H) is the consump-
tion of a patient depositor in a bad (good) bank in states 2 and 3. Equation (2.17)
is the expected utility to be maximized. The first row of the objective function is
the expected consumption of type 1 agents and the expected consumption of type
2 agents in a bad bank. The second row represents the expected consumption of
type 2 agents in a good bank. Equation (2.18) is the period 0 constraint, where as
before y is the amount invested in storage, x the amount invested in the illiquid asset
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and zj (zi) are total interbank loans received from (given to) the neighbor banks.
Equation (2.19) is the first period constraint, and equations (2.20) to (2.23) are the
second period ones, that will depend on the bank type and the state. Equation
(2.20) corresponds to the case where a depositor is at a bad bank that is in states 2
or 3. The equation states that the consumption offered to patient depositors comes
from the bank’s project return (RLx), less its obligations with the banking system
(zjR
Lx) plus the funds received from its neighbors (zijR
Hx + zijR
Lx). Equation
(2.21) corresponds to the case of a bad bank in state 1. The bad bank is connected
to two good banks. Similarly, equation (2.22) represents the contract offered to pa-
tient depositors by a good bank that is in states 2 or 3, while equation (2.23) is the
one offered by a good bank that is in state 1. Finally, equation (2.24) is the incentive
compatibility constraint, which is expressed in expected terms, as the bank ignores
both its return and that of its neighbors.
Although c12L = c
2
2H = c
H
2 and c
2
2L = c
1
2H = c
L
2 , we will treat them separately
because they will have different consequences in understanding the equilibria.
Let
Ψ =
{
y, x, c1N , {cs2i}s=1,2i=L,H
}
be the optimal allocation offered to consumers-depositors in an incomplete mar-
ket structure of the neighboring case. It will be shown that in this case the first
best allocation is not achievable. In the neighboring case, a depositor would find it
optimal ex-post to liquidate his deposits prematurely if the cost of obtaining infor-
mation about their bank type in the first period is not too high, and provided other
depositors are also acquiring information.
Equilibria with liquidation and Contagion in the Neighboring Case
In this case, the possible equilibria are: a verification equilibrium with partial runs
(with and without contagion), a verification equilibrium with total runs, a full-run
equilibrium and a no-run equilibrium. In the last two equilibria, depositors do not
verify the type of banks. They either withdraw from all banks or do not acquire
information and do not withdraw.
As shown below, if condition (2.27) is satisfied, when depositors verify the type of
banks, and they are in states 2 or 3, it is always optimal to withdraw their deposits
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from bad banks. As a result, these banks have to liquidate their technology and their
interbank loans, and will be able to pay a total amount of ĉ1N =
xr+y+zijc1N
1+zij
< c1N .
6
On the other hand, the good bank will have to liquidate part of its long term asset in
order to pay its interbank loans to the bad bank; however it won’t enter into a bank
run as long as ĉ2H =
RH(1−λ)x
(1−γ) > c1N , where λ is the proportion of the investment in
the long term asset that has to be liquidated in the first date in the good bank in
order to be able to guarantee the promised consumption of c1N .
7
Nevertheless, if second period consumption in the good bank is less than the
promised one, that is, ĉ2H < cH2 , the good bank is affected by contagion and is
contractually bankrupt. This is the case of a verification equilibrium with partial
bank runs and contagion. There is contagion because the expansion bank, even if
it does not experience a run, it cannot pay its promised consumption to its late
consumers.8
Another interesting case is the one of state 1, where a good bank is connected
to two bad banks. In this state, depositors of good banks will generate a financial
crisis due to the fundamentals of bad banks. As c1N > cL2 patient depositors have
incentives to withdraw from the good banks (note that c22L = c
1
2H = c
L
2 ). On the
other hand, if we define ĉ2L =
xRL(1−λ)
(1−γ) , where as before λ is the proportion of the
investment in the long term asset that has to be liquidated in the first date in the
bad bank in order to be able to guarantee a consumption of c1N , then as ĉ2L < c1N
patient depositors will also withdraw from bad banks. The curiosity is that if patient
depositors of good banks wait until t = 2, they would receive less than depositors
from bad banks. In this verification equilibrium with total bank runs all depositors
receive xr + y.9
6Notice that ĉ1N =
xr+y+zijc1N+zij ĉ1N
1+zi
, where the numerator represents assets available given
by the liquidation of the long term asset, the storage technology and liquidation of interbank
loans with the good and the bad bank respectively. The liabilities of the bank are given by the
denominator of the equation. Therefore, ĉ1N =
xr+y+zijc1N
1+zij
.
7with λ = [C1N (γ+zij)−y−zijĈ1N ]rx .
8This verification equilibrium with contagion will occur whenever λ is greater than a value
λ∗, for which ĉ2H = cH2 , that is, λ
∗ = 1/3(R
H−RL)
RH
. We thank the reviewer for pointing out this
possibility.
9This equilibrium takes place because of the linkages that good banks have established ex ante,
due to the uncertainty about the future return. Finally, those linkages result in worse than being
alone. This can be the case of depositors of banks in developed countries disapproving of their
banks investing in other banks in underdeveloped countries.
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The following propositions describe conditions for the existence of the different
equilibria. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
Proposition 2 In states 2 and 3, there is a verification equilibrium in which only
bad banks are liquidated and good banks can either be affected or not by contagion,
whereas in state 1, all depositors will withdraw their deposits generating a financial
crisis based on fundamentals.
The previous statement is going to be true when the following conditions are
satisfied:
c1N ≥ cL2 (2.27)
ĉ2H ≥ c1N (2.28)
1
3
u(ĉ2H − ε) + 1
3
u(xr + y − ε) + 1
3
u(ĉ1N − ε) ≥ 1
3
u(ĉ2H) +
2
3
u(0) (2.29)
1
3
u(ĉ2H − ε) + 1
3
u(xr + y − ε) + 1
3
u(ĉ1N − ε) ≥
1
3
u(c1N) +
1
3
u(ĉ1N) +
1
3
u(xr + y) (2.30)
Equation (2.27) indicates that the lowest possible consumption in the second
period is smaller than consumption promised to impatient depositors. As a result
it is optimal for patient depositors of bad banks in states 2 and 3 to withdraw
their deposits in the first period (as well as for patient depositors of good banks in
state 1). Equation (2.28) guarantees that good banks will have enough resources to
compensate patient depositors and avoid a bank run in states 2 and 3.
Finally, equations (2.29) and (2.30) state that if all other depositors are playing
the verification equilibrium it is optimal to play it.10
Additionally, we still have the traditional equilibria, which are given in the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 3 The no-run and the full run are also Nash Equilibria of this game,
if the following conditions are satisfied:
1
2
u(cH2 ) +
1
2
u(cL2 ) ≥ u(c1N) (2.31)
10For a better description of these two equations, see the Appendix A.
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1
2
u(c1N − ε) + 1
2
u(cH2 − ε) ≤
1
2
u(cH2 ) +
1
2
u(cL2 ) (2.32)
c1N ≥ r (2.33)
Equations (2.31) and (2.32) guarantee that an agent has no incentive to deviate
in the no run equilibrium. Equation (2.31) is the incentive compatibility constraint
while equation (2.32) guarantees that the benefit obtained by verifying and with-
drawing when the outcome is inefficient, is lower than the expected utility achieved
in the no-run equilibrium. Finally, equation (2.33) guarantees the existence of the
full run equilibrium. This condition says that if all depositors withdraw in the first
period, neither good nor bad banks have enough resources to pay them the promised
amount of c1N .
2.4.3 The Island Case
In the island case, each bank is financially connected to just one bank in the system.
As a consequence, we also have three possible states: One case where a good bank
is connected to the other good and the bad bank to the other bad one, figure 4(a)
and two cases where a good bank is linked to a bad bank, figure 4(b) and figure
4(c). Each state is going to be equally probable.
G1 B2 B3 G4
G1 0 0 0 1
B2 0 0 1 0
B3 0 1 0 0
G4 1 0 0 0
G1 B2 B3 G4
G1 0 0 1 0
B2 0 0 0 1
B3 1 0 0 0
G4 0 1 0 0
G1 B2 B3 G4
G1 0 1 0 0
B2 1 0 0 0
B3 0 0 0 1
G4 0 0 1 0
(a) State I (b) State II (c) State III
Figure 4. States of nature in the Island Case
In this case, banks will maintain total interbank loans of zi =
1
2
and so zj =
1
2
.
Decentralized Economy with Banks 43
Now, consumers-depositors are going to solve the following problem:
Max
{x,y,c1,{ct2i}t=1,2i=L,H}
γu(c1I) + (1− γ)
{
1
2
[
2
3
u(cB2L) +
1
3
u(cA2L)
]
+
1
2
[
1
3
u(cA2H) +
2
3
u(cB2H)
]}
(2.34)
subject to
x+ y − zi + zj ≤ 1; (2.35)
γc1I ≤ y; (2.36)
(1− γ)cA2L ≤ [RL(1− zj) +RLzi]x = RLx; (2.37)
(1− γ)cB2L ≤ [RL(1− zj) +RHzi]x = [
1
2
RL +
1
2
RH ]x; (2.38)
(1− γ)cA2H ≤ [RH(1− zj) +RHzi]x = RHx; (2.39)
(1− γ)cB2H ≤ [RH(1− zj) +RLzi]x = [
1
2
RH +
1
2
RL]x; (2.40)
1
2
[
2
3
u(cB2L) +
1
3
u(cA2L)] +
1
2
[
1
3
u(cA2H) +
2
3
u(cB2H)] ≥ u(c1I) (2.41)
x ≥ 0; y ≥ 0; c1I ≥ 0; cA2L ≥ 0; cB2L ≥ 0; cA2H ≥ 0; cB2H ≥ 0 (2.42)
where c1I is the consumption of an impatient consumer, c
A
2L (c
A
2H) is the con-
sumption of a patient depositor of a bad (good) bank in state I, and cB2L (c
B
2H) is the
consumption of a patient depositor of a bad (good) bank in states II and III. Equa-
tion (2.34) is the expected utility to be maximized. The first row of the objective
function is the consumption of type 1 agents and the expected consumption of type
2 agents in a bad bank. The second row represents the expected consumption of
type 2 agents in a good bank. Equation (2.35) is the period 0 constraint, where y is
the amount invested in storage, x the amount invested in the illiquid asset and zj
(zi) are total interbank loans received from (given to) the partner bank. Equation
(2.36) is the first period constraint, and equations (2.37) to (2.40) are the second
period ones, that will depend on the bank type and the state. Equation (2.37) corre-
sponds to the case of a bad bank in state I. It states that the consumption of patient
depositors comes from the banks’s return (RLx), less its obligation with the system
(zjR
Lx), and from the return obtained from the other bank (zijR
Lx). Equation
(2.38) corresponds to the case of a bad bank in states II and III. Similarly, equation
(2.39) refers to the case of a good bank in state I and equation (2.40)represents the
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case of a good bank in states II and III. Finally, equation (2.41) is the incentive
compatibility constraint, which is expressed in expected terms, as the bank ignores
both its return and that of its neighbors.
Let
Ψˆ =
{
yˆ, xˆ, cˆ1I , {cˆs2i}s=A,Bi=L,H
}
be the optimal allocation offered to consumers-depositors in an incomplete mar-
ket structure of the island case. It will be shown that the equilibrium achieved in the
island case is worse than the first best allocation achieved in the complete market
structure and also worse than the second best offered in the neighboring case.
Equilibria with liquidation in the Island Case
In the island case, three different equilibria are possible: a verification equilibrium
(with partial bank runs), a full-run equilibrium and a no run-equilibrium.
In the verification equilibrium, depositors verify the type of banks, and withdraw
from bad ones. As a result, in state I, impatient and patient depositors of bad
banks will receive xr+ y. Impatient depositors of good banks will receive ĉ1I , while
patient depositors of good banks will receive ĉA2H . In the other two cases (states II
and III), impatient depositors will receive cˆ1I , while patient depositors will receive
cˆB2H = cˆ
B
2L = cˆ
T
2 .
The difference with the verification equilibrium of the neighboring case is that
NO contagion occurs.
The following propositions describe conditions for the existence of the different
equilibria. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
Proposition 4 In state I of the Island case, there is a verification equilibrium where
depositors of bad banks withdraw their deposit in the first period due to fundamentals
and depositors of good banks wait until t = 2 and obtain the maximum return, if the
following conditions are satisfied:
cˆ1I ≥ cˆA2L (2.43)
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2
3
u(cˆT2 − ε) +
1
6
(xr + y − ε) + 1
6
(cˆA2H − ε) ≥
2
3
u(cˆT2 ) +
1
6
u(0) +
1
6
u(cˆA2H) (2.44)
2
3
u(cˆT2 − ε) +
1
6
u(xr + y − ε) + 1
6
u(cˆA2H − ε) ≥
5
6
u(cˆ1I) +
1
6
u(xr + y) (2.45)
Equation (2.43) guarantees that it is optimal for depositors of bad banks to
withdraw their deposits in the first period. Equations (2.44) and (2.45) ensure that
if all agents play the verification equilibrium, it is not optimal for any agent to
deviate.
As in the neighboring case, we have the traditional equilibria, which are summa-
rized in the proposition below:
Proposition 5 In the Island Case, the no-run and the full-run are still Nash Equi-
libria, if the following conditions are satisfied:
2
3
u(cˆT2 ) +
1
6
u(cˆA2L) +
1
6
u(cˆA2H) ≥ u(cˆ1I) (2.46)
2
3
u(cˆT2 ) +
1
6
u(cˆA2L) +
1
6
u(cˆA2H) ≥
2
3
u(cˆT2 − ε) +
1
6
u(cˆ1I − ε) + 1
6
u(cˆA2H − ε) (2.47)
cˆ1I ≥ r (2.48)
Equations (2.46) and (2.47) guarantee that an agent has no incentive to deviate
in the no run equilibrium. Equation (2.46) is the incentive compatibility constraint
while equation (2.47) guarantees that the benefit obtained by verifying and with-
drawing when the outcome is inefficient, is lower that the expected utility achieved
in the no-run equilibrium. Finally, equation (2.48) guarantees the existence of the
full run equilibrium. This is the condition that guarantees that if all depositors
withdraw in the first period, neither good nor bad banks have enough resources to
pay them the promised amount of ĉ1I .
2.5 The Role for a Central Bank
As a consequence of the rapid spread of the Asian crisis of 1997 – 1998 to the global
financial markets, the IMF introduced the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) in 1999.
The idea of the CCL was to provide a precautionary line of defense for members
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with sound policies, who were not at risk of an external payments crisis of their own
making, but were vulnerable to contagion effects from capital account crisis in other
countries. The package allowed those countries that met certain eligibility criteria,
to draw on a pre-specified amount of resources if hit by a financial crisis due to
factors outside of the member’s control.
We have seen in the previous sections that in the presence of an incomplete
market structure of the neighboring case, banks are subject to the risk of contagion
and financial crises. In this section, we will show that there is a role for a Central
Bank to complete markets. In our setting, the Central Bank will require reserves
from banks at date 0 and will redistribute such reserves into the banking system in
the form of credit lines to banks. With the Central Bank, the first best allocation
is achieved when the financial system is incomplete.11
The World Bank and other international institutions like the IMF reallocate
resources during financial crises. In what follows, we show that such behavior can
be socially optimal. The Central Bank is going to require reserves of (Ti=
1
4
) from
each bank which is going to maintain in the system (Tj =
1
4
) in order to allow banks
to maximize depositors’ expected utility.
These reserves work in the same way as interbank loans, banks will have to pay
an amount to the Central Bank, that is contingent on the resources available in the
second period, that is, Tj[R˜i−zjR˜i+ziR˜j]x (where R˜i is the expected return from our
technology, and R˜j is the expected return from our neighbor banks). Additionally,
banks will receive a payment in the form of a “Contingent Credit Line” from the
Central Bank that will restore the social optimal allocation. The intuition says that
the Central Bank will complete markets, and so bad banks that are in states 2 and
3 and good banks in state 1 will receive TiR
Hx, which is more than what they pay
(TiR
Hx > Tj[R
L(1 − zj) + RHzij + RLzij]x). On the other hand, good banks that
are in states 2 and 3, and bad banks of state 1 will receive TiR
Lx, which is less than
what they pay (TiR
Lx < Tj[R
L(1− zj) +RHzij +RHzij]x).12
11It should be noted that in the island case, there is no role for a Central Bank, as in the bad
state of nature there is no contagion and that is why bad banks are penalized and good banks are
not affected.
12Recall that patient depositors of bad banks in states 2 and 3 obtained the same consumption
as patient depositors of good banks in state 1 (c22L = c
1
2H = c
L
2 ). Similarly, patient depositors of
good banks in states 2 and 3 received the same as those of bad banks in state 1 (c12L = c
2
2H = c
H
2 ).
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The problem to be maximized, when a Central Bank is introduced, is as follows:
Max
{x,y,c1N ,{ct2i}t=1,2i=L,H}
γu(c1N) + (1− γ)
{
1
2
[
1
3
u(c12L) +
2
3
u(c22L)
]
+
1
2
[
1
3
u(c12H) +
2
3
u(c22H)
]}
(2.49)
subject to
x+ y − zi + zj − Ti + Tj ≤1; (2.50)
γc1N ≤y; (2.51)
(1− γ)c22L ≤ {[RL(1− zj) +RHzij +RLzij](1− Tj) + TiRH ]}x (2.52)
(1− γ)c12L ≤ {[RL(1− zj) +RHzij +RHzij](1− Tj) + TiRL}x (2.53)
(1− γ)c12H ≤ {[RH(1− zj) +RLzij +RLzij](1− Tj) + TiRH ]}x (2.54)
(1− γ)c22H ≤ {[RH(1− zj) +RLzij +RHzij](1− Tj) + TiRL}x (2.55)
1
2
[
1
3
u(c12L) +
2
3
u(c22L)
]
+
1
2
[
1
3
u(c12H) +
2
3
u(c22H)
]
≥ u(c1N) (2.56)
x ≥ 0; y ≥ 0; c1N ≥ 0; c12L ≥ 0; c22L ≥ 0; c12H ≥ 0; c22H ≥ 0; (2.57)
zi =
∑
zij; Ti = Tj =
1
4
(2.58)
Equation (2.49) is equal to equation (2.17), the objective function in the neigh-
boring case. Equation (2.50) is the budget constraint, that is equal to equation
(2.18) of the neighboring case, except that it considers reserves required and re-
ceived from the Central Bank. Equation (2.51) is the first period constraint which
is also identical to equation (2.19) in the neighboring case and finally, equations
(2.52) to (2.55) are the second period constraints, which take into account amounts
paid to and received from the Central Bank, respectively.
Equation (2.52) corresponds to the case where a depositor is at a bad bank
that is in states 2 or 3. Recall that the bad bank is connected to one good bank
and to one bad one. In this case, the bank pays a proportion Tjx of the resources
available in the second period, that is, Tjx[R
L(1 − zj) + RHzij + RLzij], and so it
has (1 − Tj)x[RL(1 − zj) + RHzij + RLzij] left. On the other hand, it receives the
amount TixR
H as a contingent credit line. The rest of the equations have a similar
interpretation. Equation (2.53) corresponds to the case of a bad bank in state 1.
Equation (2.54) represents the contract offered to patient depositors by a good bank
that is in states 2 or 3, while equation (2.55) is the one offered by a good bank that
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is in state 1. Finally, equation (2.56) is the incentive compatibility constraint, which
is identical to equation (2.24) of the neighboring case.
Under these conditions, it is easy to show that the first best allocation is achieved.
Notice that c22L = c
1
2H =
{[RL(1−zj)+RHzij+RLzij ](1−Tj)+TiRH ]}x
1−γ =
Rx
1−γ . Similarly, c
1
2L =
c22H =
[RL(1−zj)+RHzij+RHzij ](1−Tj)+TiRLx
1−γ =
Rx
1−γ , and so the problem is reduced to the
social planner’s problem analyzed in section 3.
The idea is that the Central Bank guarantees the optimal level of risk sharing
and therefore avoids contagion and financial crises. Those international institutions
work as international market insurers (or market completers), since it is frequent
to observe that although some financial systems are not connected due to political
or economic reasons, they can be indirectly connected through those international
institutions in order to avoid financial crises and increase social welfare.
It should be noted that in practice the behavior of the IMF is affected by the
fear of moral hazard problems. This implies that the CCL would be extended in
state 1, or in states 2 and 3, but when there is contagion (λ > λ∗). In our setting
moral hazard is absent and so it is welfare superior to avoid information gathering
and to prevent every financial crisis equilibria.
2.6 Numerical Example
A numerical example nicely illustrates the results presented in this paper. In the
example that follows, preferences and parameters values are displayed in the upper
part of the table; while the results from the optimization problem appear in columns
1, 2, 3 and 4 for the complete market structure, the neighboring case, the island case
and autarky, respectively. For these values, all the conditions for the existence of
the different equilibria in the neighboring case are satisfied for any ε ∈ (0, 058; 0, 06).
Similarly, all the conditions for the existence of the different equilibria in the island
cased are satisfied for any ε ∈ (0, 126; 0, 151). Note that for these values verification
is never socially optimal, as ε∗ = 0, 023.
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Value of Parameters
u(c1) u(c2) R
H RL r γ R k
Ln(c1 + k) Ln(c2 + k) 1.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.000001
λ λ∗ ε∗
0.25 0.235 0.023
Complete Neighboring Island Autarky
Market structure Case Case
x = 0.5 x = 0.5 x = 0.5 x = 0.514
y = 0.5 y = 0.5 y = 0.5 y = 0.486
c1 = 1 c1N = 1 c1I = 1 c1IMP = 0.973
c2 = 1.1 c22L = 0.9 c
A
2L = 0.5 c2H = 1.7458
EU = 0.0476 c12L = 1.3 c
B
2L = 1.1 c2L = 0.513
c12H = 0.9 c
A
2H = 1.7 EU = −0.041
c22H = 1.3 c
B
2H = 1.1
EU = 0.039 EU = 0.0182
(xr + y) = 0.75 (xr + y) = 0.75
ĉ1N = 0.8125
ĉ2H = 1.275
ĉ2L = 0.375
Table 1: Numerical Example
Additionally, we obtain that in states 2 and 3 of the neighboring case there is a
verification equilibrium with partial bank runs and contagion. There is contagion
because the expansion bank, even if it does not experience a run, it cannot pay
its promised consumption to its late consumers. Recall that this equilibrium takes
place whenever the proportion of the long term asset that is liquidated at t=1
(λ), is greater than a threshold level of λ∗, which guarantees that second period
consumption is equal to the promised one. In the example, λ = 0, 25 > λ∗ = 0, 235,
and so we have a verification equilibrium with partial runs and contagion.
Obviously, the highest expected utility corresponds to the complete market struc-
ture where the first best is achieved followed by the neighboring and the island
cases respectively. The occurrence of contagion does not impede that the allocation
reached in the neighboring case is higher than that of the island case. Therefore,
contagion and crisis are the consequences of the higher expected utility that can be
reached when a complete market structure is not a possible one.
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2.7 Conclusion
The paper incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of information a` la Nikitin and
Smith (2007), in a framework similar to Allen and Gale (2000). This allows us
to model the relationship between shocks to fundamentals and contagion, without
relying on any unexpected shock to model contagion.
In the paper, depositors can modify their behavior due to the use of costly
information. When the system is at rest, individuals do not find it optimal to gather
information and so our model explains why there are periods in which individuals do
not modify their expectations on banks. However, if for any reason they decide to
invest in information gathering they would penalize those states of nature in which
banks establish inefficient links. This would cause the liquidation of bad projects,
but it might also generate contagion and financial crises when financial linkages are
very inaccurate.
In the neighboring case, two possible equilibria with contagion, due to funda-
mentals, are possible. In the first one, bad banks fail and good banks are affected by
contagion. Even though good banks are not affected by bank runs and can meet their
obligations with impatient depositors, the malfunctioning of the interbank payment
system obliges them to liquidate part of their long term technology. As a result,
good banks go bankrupt in the second period. In the second equilibrium, depositors
in good banks withdraw their deposits generating a collapse of the entire banking
system. These equilibria have very low probability but can explain the occurrence
of some international financial crises.
From our analysis, it can be concluded that a complete market structure is
resilient to shocks in fundamentals. For the case of incomplete market structures,
we find that the more incomplete the banking structure is, read the island case, the
less vulnerable to contagion it is. Nevertheless, depositors prefer the neighboring
case to the island case. In this respect our results are similar to those of Brusco
and Castiglionesi (2007). They find that banks establish links and accept the risk
of contagion only when the risk is not too big.
Finally, we analyze the existence of international institutions like the World Bank
and the IMF. In our model, those institutions appear as an optimal solution when
political restrictions impede perfect capital flows. We present the importance of
some mechanisms like the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) of the IMF to eradicate
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crises and prevent contagion.
It should be noted that in our setting moral hazard is absent and so it is welfare
superior to avoid information gathering and to prevent every financial crisis equi-
librium. An avenue for future research would be to analyze the optimality of those
institutions in the presence of moral hazard or aggregate uncertainty.
2.8 Appendix
First, consider conditions for the existence of equilibria in the Incomplete Market
Structure of the Neighboring Case.
Proof of proposition 2 : In states 2 and 3, depositors of bad banks receive cL2 ,
which is smaller than c1N (equation (2.27)). If depositors acquire information and
find out that they are in those states, they will withdraw their deposits in the first
year. Equation (2.28) guarantees that patient depositors of good banks will still find
it beneficial to wait until t=2, and so there are no bank runs. On the other hand, if
depositors gather information and realize that they are in state 1, they would behave
as impatient consumers and will generate a financial crisis. Equation (2.27) ensures
that patient depositors of good banks would prefer to behave as impatient depositors
(note that c12H = c
2
2L = c
L
2 ), but since bad banks don’t have enough resources to
compensate its interbank loans, patient depositors of bad banks will also withdraw
their deposits generating a global financial crisis.
Finally, equations (2.29) and (2.30) ensure that if all other agents are playing
the verification equilibrium, it is optimal to play it. Equation (2.29) states that
the expected utility an agent achieves by acquiring information and withdrawing
from inefficient banks is higher than that obtained by doing nothing, and waiting
until the second year. Equation (2.30) ensures that an indiscriminate withdrawal is
neither optimal.
Proof of proposition 3 : Equations (2.31) and (2.32) ensure that patient depositors
do not have an incentive to deviate in the no-run equilibrium. Equation (2.31) is
the incentive compatibility constraint that results from:
1
2
[
1
3
u(c12L) +
2
3
u(c22L)
]
+
1
2
[
1
3
u(c12H) +
2
3
u(c22H)
]
≥ u(c1N)
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where the left hand side is the expected utility of patient depositors and the
right hand side is the expected utility of impatient ones. We obtain the result of the
formula by making use of the fact that c12L = c
2
2H = c
H
2 and c
2
2L = c
1
2H = c
L
2 .
Equation (2.32) guarantees that the expected utility of patient depositors is
greater than the expected utility obtained by the policy of acquiring information
and withdrawing when the consumption offered for being patient is low.
Finally, equation (2.33) guarantees the existence of the full run equilibrium. This
is the condition that guarantees that if all depositors withdraw in the first period,
neither good nor bad banks have enough resources to pay them the promised amount
of c1N .
Second, consider conditions for the existence of equilibria in the Incomplete Mar-
ket Structure of the Island Case.
Proof of Proposition 4: In state I, if depositors from bad banks obtain informa-
tion and realize that they are in that state, they will receive ĉA2L which is less than
ĉ1I , so they will behave as impatient depositors. As a consequence, bad banks are
liquidated and pay xr + y to all depositors. Good banks are not affected by the
shock since they do not have links with bad banks, and so they will pay depositors
as promised in the demand deposit contract.
Equations (2.44) and (2.45) guarantee that if all agents play the verification
equilibrium, it is not optimal for any agent to deviate. Equation (2.44) states that
the expected utility an agent achieves by acquiring information and withdrawing
from inefficient banks is higher than that obtained by doing nothing, and waiting
until the second year. Equation (2.45) ensures that an indiscriminate withdrawal is
neither optimal.
Proof of Proposition 5: Equations (2.46) and (2.47) guarantee that if all other
agents do not gather information (play the no-run equilibrium) it is not optimal for
any agent to deviate.
Equation (2.46) is the incentive compatibility constraint that results from:
1
2
[
2
3
u(ĉB2L) +
1
3
u(ĉA2L)
]
+
1
2
[
1
3
u(ĉA2H) +
2
3
u(ĉB2H)
]
≥ u(ĉ1I)
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where the left hand side is the expected utility of patient depositors and the
right hand side is the expected utility of impatient ones. We make use of the fact
that cˆB2L=cˆ
B
2H=cˆ
T
2 .
Equation (2.47) guarantees that the expected utility of patient depositors is
greater than the expected utility obtained by the policy of acquiring information
and withdrawing when the consumption offered for being patient is low.
Finally, equation (2.48) guarantees the existence of the full run equilibrium. This
is the condition that guarantees that if all depositors withdraw in the first period,
neither good nor bad banks have enough resources to pay them the promised amount
of ĉ1N .
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Chapter 3
Financial Contagion and
Depositor Monitoring
3.1 Introduction
A number of papers have focused on the incentive properties of demand deposits.
The idea of these papers is that liquid deposits keep the bank’s portfolio choice in line
with depositors’ preferences. In these papers, the threat of a bank run by informed
depositors after receiving negative information discourages banks’ owners from in-
vesting in projects that are too risky or committing fraud. In this way, demand
deposits discipline bank managers and reduce moral hazard problems. The deposit
contract serves this role due to the combination of two inherent characteristics: the
on demand clause and the sequential service constraint. The demandable nature of
the contract motivates some depositors to monitor the bank, while the sequential
service constraint discourages free riding by depositors on others’ monitoring (see
Calomiris and Khan 1991, Flannery 1994, Jean-Baptiste 1999, Gorton and Huang
2002a, 2003).1
This paper analyzes market discipline in a many banks economy, where conta-
gion may arise. A common feature of this contagion literature is that banks have
incentives to establish links ex ante but during a crisis, the failure of one institution
1Qi (1998) and Diamond and Rajan (2001a, 2001b, 2005, 2006), also study the disciplinary
effects of liquid deposits in models that abstract from asymmetric information.
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may have negative effects on other institutions to which it is linked (see Allen and
Gale, 2000, Brusco and Castiglionesi, 2007, Castiglionesi, 2007 and chapter II).
We follow this strand of the literature in order to motivate the existence of the
interbank market. In particular, we build on the paper by Brusco and Castiglionesi
(from now on BC, 2007), but we introduce the possibility of differently informed
depositors. BC (2007) analyzed the propagation of financial crises among regions
affected by moral hazard problems. In their paper, the existence of limited liabil-
ity and insufficiently capitalized banks promoted excessive risk taking by banks.
This lead to a situation where bankruptcy (and contagion) occurred with positive
probability.
Information in our setting induces depositors to run on banks and so the moral
hazard problem can be eliminated. This paper shows that when information is
considered, depositors might prefer a contract that is subject to bank-runs in the
interim period (and therefore avoids moral hazard by banks) to a contract in which
depositors allow banks to gamble with their funds (moral hazard), when those banks
are insufficiently capitalized, provided that the probability of success of the gambling
asset is low. The existence of partial deposit insurance in many economies generates
strong incentives for big depositors to monitor banks’ activities, and so they will
prevent banks from investing in very risky assets. Furthermore, in this framework
the probability of contagion is very small (which is usually remarked by the empirical
literature, see Sheldon and Maurer, 1998, Furfine, 2003, Upper and Worms, 2002
and Wells, 2002).
This is the first paper to analyze market discipline in a many bank economy
where bank runs and contagion can interact. The paper emphasizes the importance
of information in eliminating moral hazard problems, and hence in promoting market
discipline.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the basic model is presented in
section 2. Section 3 introduces the optimal contracts under different scenarios, and
provides some comparative statics. Finally, the concluding remarks are summarized
in section 4.
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3.2 The Model
This is a three dates (t = 0, 1, 2) and one single good economy. There are two regions,
labeled A and B. Each region contains a continuum of agents and banks. Agents
are ex ante identical and are endowed with one unit of the good at t = 0. At t = 1,
individuals can be of type 1 (or impatient) with probability wi and derive utility
from consumption only in that period, or they can be of type 2 (or patient) with
probability 1-wi and derive utility from consumption only at t = 2. The probability
wi is also the fraction of impatient consumers in the population of region i, and wi
can take two values wH and wL, with wH > wL and equal probabilities. The average
fraction of impatient consumers is γ = w
H+wL
2
.
As in Allen and Gale (2005), a second class of agents is considered. Risk-neutral
investors are endowed with et units of the consumption good such that (e0, e1, e2) =
(e, 0, 0). These investors can either consume or buy shares from the banks, in such
case they receive dividends dt at t = 1, 2. Their utility function is as follows:
2
U(do, d1, d2) = Rdo + d1 + d2 (3.1)
The representative bank in each region has access to long term investment op-
portunities, and so individuals will deposit their endowment in the banking sector,
in order to exploit those opportunities. Also, as liquidity shocks are negatively cor-
related across regions, banks are interested in maintaining interbank deposits to
protect themselves against the liquidity shock.3
There are three types of assets or opportunities in this economy: the first one
takes one unit of the consumption good at t and transforms it into one unit at t+1
(storage or short asset), the second one is an illiquid but safe asset that takes one
unit at t = 0 and transforms it into R units at t = 2 with certainty, and finally
there is a second illiquid asset, the gambling asset, that transforms one unit at
T = 0 into λR units (λ > 1) with probability η and 0 with probability (1-η),with
ηλ < 1, which guarantees that it is never optimal to interrupt the safe technology
in order to invest in the gambling asset. It is assumed that when the return on the
gambling asset is λRx, only a proportion Rx is observable and so a contract can
2Since investors obtain a utility of Re by immediate consumption, they have to be rewarded at
least R for each unit of consumption they give up today.
3For a motivation and description of the interbank market, see Allen and Gale (2000).
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not be made contingent on its appearance. Additionally, due to the limited liability
assumption, depositors receive zero when the gambling asset does not succeed and
when it succeeds the unobservable part of the investment, (λ − 1)Rx, goes to the
banks’ owners. Finally, it is also assumed that the opportunity of investing in the
gambling asset appears with probability p.4
To complete the argument, we will consider that a proportion α of type 2 de-
positors are more informed and they can observe whether the opportunity to invest
in the gambling asset appears in their own bank but not in the bank in the other
region.5
3.3 Liquidity Coinsurance and Moral Hazard
3.3.1 The benchmark case
As a benchmark case, we will first analyze liquidity coinsurance and moral hazard,
in the absence of information. This is the problem introduced by BC (2007).
It should be noted that when banks are sufficiently capitalized, moral hazard is
restrained and the first best allocation is achievable through an interbank deposit
market as in Allen and Gale (2000) or BC (2007). Banks issue demand deposits and
establish an interbank market at t = 0, in order to protect themselves against the
liquidity shock. By shifting deposits across regions banks are able to achieve the
first best allocation.6
4The moral hazard problem is introduced in the same way as in BC (2007).
5This assumption is motivated by the fact that if information were costly, type 2 depositors
would be more likely to acquire information. Furthermore, if depositors were partially insured, bid
depositors would also be more likely to acquire the costly signal. These unmodeled aspects are
taken into account by assuming that a fraction of type 2 depositors becomes informed. See Jacklin
and Bhattacharya (1988) for a motivation of this assumption.
6The first best allocation can be attained by a decentralized banking system as follows: each
bank offers the first best contract (c∗1, c
∗
2, x
∗, y∗) to the depositors and to the bank in the other
region, where c∗1 =
y∗
γ , c
∗
2 =
1−y∗
1−γ , x
∗ = 1 − y∗, and c∗1 represents consumption for the type 1
consumer, c∗2 consumption for the type 2 consumer, y
∗ amount invested in storage and x∗ amount
invested in the long term asset. On the other hand it deposits (wH − γ) in the bank in the other
region. At t = 1, when a bank turns out to have the high liquidity shock it liquidates interbank
deposits held in the other bank. In the second year, interbank deposits move in the opposite
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The intuition is that when the amount of capital is large, the bank’s owners
are more reluctant to gamble with their own money, and so the bank will invest in
the safe asset. However, when capital is scarce and the probability of appearance
of the gambling asset is sufficiently low, depositors will prefer a contract that is
subject to bankruptcies and contagion to one that restricts moral hazard by banks,
by requiring banks to be sufficiently capitalized. In fact, it can be shown that this
contract converges to the first best as the probability of appearance of the gambling
asset converges to zero. 7
As we are interested in analyzing how information and bank runs eliminate moral
hazard problems and hence promote market discipline we assume that capital is
scarce so that bank’s owners will have incentives to invest in the gambling asset.
Also, it is assumed that banks can offer contracts contingent on the liquidity
shock, although not on the appearance of the gambling asset.
The problem to be solved, in the absence of information and when capital is
scarce, is the following one:8
max
x,y,k,{cst ,dst}s=L,Ht=1,2
U˜ = 1
2
{wHu(cH1 ) + (1− wH)[qu(cH2 ) + (1− q)u(cA2 )]}+
1
2
{wLu(cL1 ) + (1− wL)q[qu(cL2 ) + (1− q)u(cc2)]}+
1
2
(1− wL)(1− q)[qu(cF2 ) + (1− q)u(cB2 )]
(3.2)
subject to
ξx ≥ e, (3.3)
wHcH1 + d
H
1 ≤ y + kicL1 (3.4)
(1− wH)cA2 ≤ (y + kicL1 − wHcH1 − dH1 )− kjcA2 (3.5)
direction. See BC (2007), (pages 2279-2280) or Allen and Gale (2000), (pages 8-9).
7In particular, BC (2007) show that the bank will invest in the safe asset only if the bank’s
capital is e ≥ ξx, where ξ = η(λ− 1)/(1− ηλ), and x represents the amount invested in the long
term asset.
8This is a revised version of the original problem solved by BC (2007), (pages 2299 - 2300).
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(1− wH)cH2 + dH2 ≤ Rx+ (y + kicL1 − wHcH1 − dH1 )− kjcH2 (3.6)
wLcL1 + d
L
1 ≤ y − kjcL1 (3.7)
(1− wL)cL2 + dL2 ≤ Rx+ (y − kjcL1 − wLcL1 − dL1 ) + kicH2 (3.8)
(1− wL)cc2 ≤ Rx+ (y − kjcL1 − wLcL1 − dL1 ) + kicA2 (3.9)
(1− wL)cF2 ≤ (y − kjcL1 − wLcL1 − dL1 ) + kicH2 (3.10)
(1− wL)cB2 ≤ (y − kjcL1 − wLcL1 − dL1 ) + kicA2 (3.11)
1
2
(dH1 + qd
H
2 ) +
1
2
(dL1 + q
2dL2 ) + pη(λ− 1)Rx ≥ eR (3.12)
k ≥ 0, cA2 ≥ 0, cc2 ≥ 0, cF2 ≥ 0, cB2 ≥ 0 (3.13)
dst ≥ 0, cst ≥ 0, where s = L,H and t = 1, 2. (3.14)
y + x− ki + kj ≤ 1 + e, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, (3.15)
where ki represents interbank loans given to the other bank and kj interbank
loans received from the other bank, (with ki = kj = k), q = (1 − p) + ηp is the
probability that the gambling asset does not appear or that it appears and succeeds;
while (1− q) = p(1− η) is the probability that the gambling asset appears and fails,
cst is the consumption of a type t consumer (with t = 1, 2) in state s (with s = L,H),
when the gambling asset does not appear in none of the two regions, or it appears
and succeeds in both of them, cA2 is the consumption of a patient depositor in a high
liquidity region, when its own investment fails and so all the available funds are
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those from storage (if any), cc2 is the consumption of a patient depositor in the low
liquidity region when its long term investment is successful and the bank in the other
region (say B) fails. In this case, bank A cannot retrieve completely the interbank
deposit, and so there is contagion from region B to region A, cF2 is the consumption
of a patient depositor in the low liquidity region when its own investment fails, but
that of the other region does not. In this case, the available funds to pay depositors
are those obtained from the interbank market and from storage (if any). When both
regions’ investments fail, which happens with probability (1 − q)2, then there is a
meltdown of the entire financial system, and depositors receive cB2 .
The interpretation of this problem is as follows:9 Equation (2) is the expected
utility to be maximized. The first row of the optimization program is the expected
utility of a depositor when the region has the high liquidity shock at t = 1. Note
that in this case second period consumption is not affected by what happens in the
other region. The second and third rows represent the expected utility of a depositor
when the region is affected by a low liquidity shock at t = 1. In this case, second
period consumption is affected by what happens in the other region.
Equation (3) states that the bank is insufficiently capitalized, and so it has
incentives to invest in the gambling asset. Equation (4) is the first period constraint
in a high liquidity shock region while equations (5) and (6) are the second period
constraints in this high liquidity shock region. Equation (7) is the first period
constraint in a low liquidity shock region while equations (8) to (11) are second
period constraints for a low liquidity shock region, depending on what has happened
in the other region.
Equation (12) is the participation constraint for investors. It is explained as
follows: with probability 1/2 the bank will have a high liquidity shock, and the
capitalist receives the second period dividend if the gambling asset does not appear
or it appears and succeeds (which occurs with probability q). With probability 1/2
the bank will have a low liquidity shock, and in this case the capitalist receives the
second period dividend if in both regions either the gambling assets do not appear
or they appear and succeed (which happens with probability q2). Finally, when the
gambling asset appears and succeeds the capitalist retains the amount (λ − 1)Rx.
Equations (13) and (14) present the nonnegativity constraints. Finally, the budget
9For a detailed description of the problem see BC (2007).
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constraint at t = 0 is given by equation (15).
Let us call UB = {cB1 , cstB, xB, yB, kB} the optimal solution to the above problem.
Then, UB represents the expected utility achieved when moral hazard is allowed.
The following results are obtained.
Proposition 1 If p→ 0, the expected utility achieved under moral hazard (UB)
tends to the first best optimum. Therefore, for a sufficiently low p a contract that
allows for gambling will be preferred to one that prevents moral hazard by restricting
banks to be sufficiently capitalized.
Proof: See BC (2007).
The intuition is that the contract where moral hazard is prevented, does not
reach the first best, as it restricts the amount of the long term investment, with
respect to the optimal one. Additionally, the value of the expected utility does
not depend on p. Therefore, it can be demonstrated that for a sufficiently low p
gambling is preferred.
3.3.2 The run-proof contract
The discussion of the previous section ignored the possibility that agents could
acquire information about the bank’s investments. In this section, it is shown, that
if we assume that the bank is undercapitalized (and hence has incentives to invest in
the gambling asset) and a subset of depositors can observe whether the opportunity
to invest in the gambling asset appears in their own bank, then the characterization
of the bank’s optimization problem has to consider two new constraints. These
constraints impose that it is never optimal for informed depositors to run on the
bank upon receiving information, that is, the informed type 2 depositor does not
have incentives to mimic the type 1 depositor. We will call the result to the bank’s
optimization problem, when information is considered, the run-proof contract.
Moreover, it is also shown that the conditions under which this run-proof con-
tract is preferred, become more restrictive.
The problem to be solved, when the possibility of α informed depositors is con-
sidered, is the one analyzed in section 3.3.1, with two additional constraints:
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η[qu(cL2 ) + (1− q)u(cc2)] + (1− η)[qu(cF2 ) + (1− q)u(cB2 )] ≥ u(cL1 ) (3.16)
ηu(cH2 ) + (1− η)u(cA2 ) ≥ u(cH1 ) (3.17)
These equations state that when an informed depositor observes that the gam-
bling asset has appeared, he has no incentives to withdraw in the low and high
liquidity regions, respectively. Observe that when η → 1, both constraints are auto-
matically satisfied and we are in the benchmark case, of section 3.3.1, that does not
take into account the incentive compatibility constraints (that ignores information).
In general, we can define a value η∗, as the lowest value of the parameter η for which
the more restrictive of the two incentive constraints (16) and (17) is automatically
satisfied. Note that for values of η ≥ η∗, we are in the benchmark case.
Let U˜(p, η denote the expected utility achieved when banks offer the run-proof
contract.
3.3.3 Informed Depositors and Bank Runs
The run-proof contract of the preceding section, is compared to one in which in-
terim information is ignored, that is, the bank designs the ex ante contract as if no
information appeared at t = 1. The problem to be solved is the benchmark case of
section 3.3.1. Nevertheless, in this case, bank runs will take place at t = 1. In fact,
for values of η ≤ η∗, constraints (16) and (17) are never satisfied and so informed
type 2 agents will find it optimal to withdraw at t = 1. However, it will be shown,
that the allocation that involves runs might be preferred to the run-proof contract
of the preceding section.10
Let us describe the sequence of events at date t = 1. First, banks observe the
liquidity shock and withdraw interbank deposits when its region results to be in the
high liquidity demand one. Then, the appearance of the gambling asset is observed
by banks and informed depositors and finally, impatient and informed depositors
10For a similar type of analysis, in a single bank economy without Moral Hazard, see Alonso
(1996).
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withdraw their money from banks. Recall that the first come first serve rule plus
the illiquidity of the long term investment, makes the bank subject to runs whenever
the proportion of withdrawals at t = 1 is greater than wi.
This problem can be solved by backward induction, we consider the ex-post
utility levels of the allocation obtained in section 3.3.1. Then, to compute the ex
ante utility when there is a run, we use the ex post utility levels, rearranged in order
to consider the probability of appearance of the gambling asset, and of being paid,
once type 1 and informed type 2 start to withdraw.
Let the probability of being paid in state i, when the gambling asset appears, be
ρi =
wi
α(1−wi)+wi , where the numerator represents total supply and the denominator
total demand. So with probability ρi(i = L,H), type 1 and informed type 2 receive
ci1, and with probability 1− ρi they will receive zero.11
The ex ante utility when there is a run is as follows:
Û = (1− p){1
2
[wHu(cH1 ) + (1− wH)u(cH2 )] + 12{wLu(cL1 )+
(1− wL)[(1− p)u(cL2 ) + pu(cc2)]}}
p{1
2
{wH [ρHu(cH1 ) + (1− ρH))u(0)]+
+(1− wH){αρHu(cH1 )+
[α(1− ρH) + (1− α)]u(0)}+
1
2
{[wL[ρLu(cL1 ) + (1− ρL)u(0)]+
(1− wL)[αρLu(cL1 )+
+[α(1− ρL) + (1− α)]u(0)]}}
(3.18)
Let us consider the case of a depositor in region A, that is symmetrical to that
of a depositor in region B. The first and second row represent the expected utility of
a depositor in region A, when the gambling asset does not appear in that region. If
the region faces a high liquidity shock, consumption in both periods are as promised.
However, when the region faces a low liquidity shock and in region B there was a
bank run at t = 1, the bank in region A will be affected by contagion at t = 2 since
it cannot retrieve completely its interbank loans, and so patient depositors receive
the lower amount cc2.
12 The other rows present the case where the gambling asset
11It is assumed that the long term investment is illiquid, or equivalently, that its liquidation
value is close to zero.
12The value of cc2 is given in equation (3.9).
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appears in region A (the one we are considering as home) and so the bank in region
A is affected by a bank run. Note, however, that in this allocation, contagion is a
very rare event. It occurs with lower probability than in the benchmark case. In
this case, contagion just occurs when the bank has a low liquidity shock and in the
other bank, there was a bank run at t = 1.
3.3.4 Comparative Statics
A comparison between the different allocations is summarized in the proposition
below.
Proposition 2 For values of η < η∗ and a sufficiently low p, the allocation that
allows for runs at t = 1 (and hence prevents moral hazard by banks) is preferred to the
run-proof contract, or to a contract that requires banks to be sufficiently capitalized.
In fact,
lim
p→0
Û(p) = U∗ > U˜(p, η) (3.19)
The demonstration is straightforward. The allocation that allows for runs is cal-
culated with the consumption levels of the original problem of BC (2007), derived
in section 3.3.1. Therefore, as shown in Proposition 1, as p→ 0, this allocation con-
verges to the first best. On the contrary, in the run-proof allocation, two additional
constraints need to be added to the problem of section 3.3.1, and hence the first best
cannot be reached. Similarly, the allocation that allows for runs should be preferred
to a contract that requires banks to be sufficiently capitalized (see Proposition 1).
Obviously, for values of η ≥ η∗, we are in the benchmark case, banks would be
allowed to gamble and so bankruptcy (and therefore contagion) would occur with
positive probability.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
This paper incorporates differently informed agents in the model by Brusco and
Castiglionesi (2007). It is shown that their model is a particular case of a broader
one that is presented here.
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When banks can gamble with depositors funds (given the limited liability as-
sumption), more informed depositors will monitor banks’ behavior (and hence run
on the bank) when the probability of success of the gambling asset is low. Neverthe-
less, bank runs are not necessarily bad from an ex ante point of view and contagion
is a very rare event. When the probability of success of the gambling asset is high,
depositors will let the bank gamble with their funds and so the economy will be in
BC framework, and contagion will occur with positive probability.
This is the first paper to analyze market discipline in a many banks economy
where bank runs and contagion can interact. The paper emphasizes the importance
of information in eliminating moral hazard problems, and hence in promoting market
discipline.
A policy implication of this paper is that in a presence of a fractional deposit
insurance system, big depositors (those with deposits partly uninsured) will have
incentives to monitor banks’ activity; they will try to be the first in the line at
the bank’s window in order to be paid the full amount of their deposits. This will
prevent moral hazard problems but not bank failures (see Bhattharya, Boot and
Thakor (1998) for a discussion of the optimality of partial deposit insurance and
empirical evidence that supports it).
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Chapter 4
Government, Taxes and Financial
Crises
4.1 Introduction
The recurrent episodes of financial crises have called the attention of scholars for
years. Nevertheless, it is still not clear why these crises occur nor how to resolve
them. It is frequently remarked by international institutions like the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank that a balanced budget in the public
sector is a necessary condition for stability, but is that always true? For example,
the recent financial crises of Mexico (1994) and the East Asian Emerging Markets
(1997) appeared in the absence of an unsustainable imbalanced budget. Moreover,
taxes on financial transactions have been proposed as a means of improving the
taxing capacity of developing countries. The aim of this paper is to show that in
some cases the results of such policies might be the opposite to the ones pursued.
We address the following questions: Can a government who cares about its
citizens’ welfare generate financial crises? If so, has it any power to mitigate the
effect of those crises? When is it optimal to do so? Indeed, recent examples in
Argentina and Uruguay (2001 – 2002) have shown that government policies might
in some cases intensify while in others ameliorate the effect of financial crises.1 This
1While Uruguay kept property rights, the currency denomination of bank deposits and public
debt, and promoted a mutual agreement with international debt holders, Argentina did exactly
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paper is a first attempt to give some insight in such direction.
We also study taxes on financial transactions that exist in some developing coun-
tries like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Serbia. These taxes, while improving the
taxing capacity of the government, negatively affect the financial intermediation ac-
tivity of banks. Indeed, these taxes represent an important source of funding for
those governments (22,471.9 millions of dollars for Brazil and around 2,700 millions
of dollars for Argentina in 2007), although they are subject to discrepancies by
different political parties. For example, in January 1999 the socialist President of
Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, had many difficulties to prolong and increase
such taxes, since the congress was reluctant to accept it. More recently, in December
2007, the Brazilian Government’s attempt to pass the measure failed in the congress
and was seen as the worst defeat in the history of this government. Similarly, during
the presidential election campaign of Argentina in 2007, the leader of the opposi-
tion, Ricardo Lo´pez Murphy, insisted many times on the distorting character of such
taxes and in their negative effects on the private activity.
Our objective in this paper is to highlight the importance that government poli-
cies on public expenditure play in the development as well as in the administration
of financial crises. We allow for the possibility that a government may raise taxes so
as to provide public services. The idea is that this government can use these funds to
pay the social security system, national security, education, health, recreation activi-
ties, etc. Nevertheless, taxing has an implicit cost because at the same time it lowers
the availability of funds for private investments and consequently may generate fi-
nancial crises during recessions. On the other hand, those funds might be reoriented
once a financial crisis is expected to occur, however this practice normally has an
additional cost, say for example ”bureaucracy”, that decreases its effectiveness.
We model an economy where agents face two possible types of governments and
can invest their money in banks or privately invest it in a long-term technology.
Consumers face a liquidity shock: they might become impatient or patient deposi-
tors. Impatient depositors face a utility loss from not having enough liquid assets,
and therefore the possibility of risk sharing provided by banks is generally welfare
improving. We show that in the absence of taxes, agents may not face the risk of
the opposite; more specifically, it “pesified” deposits (changed the denomination of deposits from
American dollars to Argentinean pesos), unilaterally declared default and devaluated the currency.
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a bank run but they do not consume public services either. Instead, a government
that raises taxes to invest in public services makes the system more prone to bank
runs. In this paper we also show that even though such a government is usually
an expected-utility maximizer, it might be ”responsible” for a banking crisis. We
then analyze the effectiveness of different policies in hands of governments to pre-
vent banking crises such as injecting funds previously assigned to other uses into
the banking system, reducing taxes or postponing their collection. Nevertheless,
banking crises may sometimes be unavoidable. This is the case when consumers
prefer to consume public services early and/or the government is not always able to
redirect resources efficiently, given the costs of the bureaucracy. Moreover, the gov-
ernment might have a commitment problem if avoiding crises implies going against
its principles (like reducing the provision of public services).
This paper is related to several papers in the banking literature. In the seminal
paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), banks are considered to be liquidity providers,
but are subject to bank runs in the form of sunspots. In our setting, agents also face
liquidity shocks but bank runs are the result of a bad signal about the success of the
long-term project. Relatedly, Gorton (1988) suggests that bank runs are not due to
sunspots but to the existence of rational agents that modify their expectations due
to a change in economic conditions (e.g., a change in the business cycle).
In our paper, a smaller banking activity is compensated by a greater government
size. Governments and banks improve welfare but they have to compete for private
funds. Besides the fact that a government can provide more public services, it makes
banking crises more likely to occur. Thus, crises occur with positive probability as
in Cooper and Ross (1998) and Chang and Velasco (2000a, 2000b). The difference
is that in our model, crises are the result of updating the belief on the evolution of
bank loans (fundamentals) and not the result of sunspots.2 Our paper is close in
spirit to Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), which presents bank runs as a phenomenon
closely related to the state of the business cycle.
We build on the model of Chen and Hasan (2006), although we modify their
framework by introducing a government that may raise taxes so as to provide public
services. Additionally, in our model, depositors receive a clearer signal about the
2Recent studies, see e.g., chapter II and chapter III of this thesis, have shown that information
concerning the evolution of bank loans plays an important role not only in generating a banking
crisis but also in its propagation.
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evolution of the investments. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first article
that analyses bank runs due to the presence of taxes so as to provide public services
in a closed economy with banks. Moreover, we investigate the effectiveness of taxes
on financial transactions extensively used in emerging markets. For open economies,
Chang (2007) presents a very good approach for the coexistence of financial and
political crises but without focusing either on the financial activity of banks or on
the role of the government as a provider of public services, which are our main
concerns. Moreover, we investigate how governments can affect the occurrence as
well as the resolution of banking crises instead of focusing only on the bank side as
it is the case in most of the previous academic literature on banking.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic features
of the model. Section 3 describes the basic trade-off that governments face and how
bank runs can be originated. Section 4 analyzes different government policies that
may resolve a banking crisis. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 The Model
We consider a three-date (0, 1, and 2) and one-good economy. There is a continuum
of agents, with measure one, in the economy. Each agent receives an endowment of
one unit of the good at date 0 and can deposit it at a bank or, alternatively, invest it
in a long-term project. At date 2 this long-term project transforms each unit of the
good into R units with probability p and nothing with probability 1− p. Let p = p0
be the prior probability of success of this project. We assume that p0R > 1, so the
long-term project has a positive expected rate of return, moreover this technology
can be liquidated at no cost. At date 1, depositors receive a public signal s  {H,L}
on the true return of the long-term project, where H reveals that the probability
of success is higher than 1/2 and L reveals the contrary. Depositors update their
beliefs in accord with Bayes’ rule. Let pH and pL be, respectively, the posterior
probabilities of success when s = H and s = L. We assume that pH > p0 > p
L,4
and that pLR > 1, so the long-term project yields a profitable expected return even
3For an excellent review of the academic literature on banking see chapter I and Gorton and
Winton (2003).
4Therefore, pH ≡ Pr[R|H] = Pr[H|R]∗p0/(Pr[H|R]∗p0+Pr[H|0]∗(1−p0)) and pL ≡ Pr[R|L] =
Pr[L|R] ∗ p0/(Pr[L|R] ∗ p0 + Pr[L|0] ∗ (1− p0)).
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if agents receive the bad signal.
We consider two possible types of governments: K and M . At date 1 the type-
K government raises τ taxes to invest in a public asset that costs T , i.e., τ = T
with 0 < T < 1.5 All agents, depositors and those who invest in the long-term
project, must pay these taxes. The public asset transforms the T units of the good
into public services that are consumed by everybody simultaneously afterwards. We
assume that the consumer’s utility of consuming public services is a linear function
of its global cost: θT , where θ > 0. Conversely, the type-M government does not
raise taxes, so τ = 0.
Banks offer divisible contracts such that depositors can withdraw part of their
deposits at date 1. The incumbent government’s type i = K,M is common knowl-
edge among all agents. For a given type i, the government’s objective is to maximize
the agents’ expected utility.
We assume that this economy has a given level of public debt at the very begin-
ning, which, for simplicity of exposition, is in the hand of banks. If banks sell the
debt during a crisis, then they will receive a zero payoff (a junk bond), whereas the
government can repurchase the debt whenever it wants.6
At date 1 agents face a liquidity shock: a proportion γ of them becomes impatient
and must consume by date 1. While agents do not know at date 0 whether they
will be impatient (type-1) or patient (type-2) at date 1, they know the value of γ.
If impatient agents consume less than r > 1 of the private good at date 1, they
will suffer a disutility X > 0. Normally agents face fixed payments. Nevertheless,
sometimes they may need extra funds to deal with special contingencies. In such a
case, they need liquid assets in order to afford the payments plus the contingencies,
i.e., so as to cover r. Conversely, if they do not have enough cash, then they will not
5We assume that the size of the public expenditure, T , is exogenous. For instance, T could be
the result of a political program or the rate of taxation at which maximal revenue is generated
(the point at which the Laffer curve achieves its maximum).
6For example, in 2001 economic difficulties led the Argentinean government to oblige banks to
buy public bonds. However, this in turn raised the interest rate and as a result lowered the price
of the public bonds. By the end of 2001, the situation was worse and the panic spread through the
depositors, consequently the banks were forced to constrain the withdrawals of bank deposits (the
so-called “corralito”). The banking system collapsed and a massive popular revolt that toppled
the government followed.
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only have to deal with the bureaucracy, but also have to face different costs (e.g.,
bankruptcy, dealing with lawyers, searching costs) so as to get cash, this can be seen
as a utility loss (X) of having illiquid assets and facing special contingencies. Let ct
denote the agent’s consumption at date t. The utility function of type-1 agents in
the type-M government, UM1 , is
UM1 (c
M
1 , X) =
{
cM1 −X if cM1 < r
cM1 if c
M
1 ≥ r
,
whereas the type-2 agents’ utility function is UM2 (c
M
1 , c
M
2 ) = c
M
1 + c
M
2 . Instead, in
the type-K government the agents’ utility functions are given by UK1 (c
K
1 , X, T ) =
UM1 (c
K
1 , X) + θT and U
K
2 (c
K
1 , c
K
2 , T ) = c
K
1 + c
K
2 + θT , respectively.
We assume a perfectly competitive banking industry, so the banks’ expected
profit is zero. At the beginning of date 0 each bank offers a deposit contract d =
(d1, d2) to agents, where dt denotes the maximum amount of money that they can
withdraw at date t, i.e., contracts are divisible and agents can withdraw any amount
of money y equal or less than dt at date t. Notice that any impatient depositor who
has not invested his money in a bank succeeds to obtain one unit of the good from
liquidation, consequently, such an agent will always suffer the utility loss X. Thus,
the existence of a banking industry that promises d1 ≥ r should improve his welfare.
At t = 1, the depositor’s type is private information; banks therefore must pay any
amount of money y ≤ d1 to every depositor who wants to withdraw. Moreover,
depositors are sequentially served, so if all of them run to withdraw their money
at date 1, only a fraction of them will receive the promised amount. Nonetheless,
we impose that banks must pay at least T to every depositor, so that they can pay
taxes. Additionally, in section 4.2.2 we will study taxes on financial transactions.
The sequence of events is as follows: at t = 0 and for a given type of government
i, agents invest their resources in banks or in the long-term investment project; at
t = 1, all agents (also those that do not invest in banks) pay taxes and consume
public services in the presence of a type-K government, moreover they receive the
public signal s and some of them suffer the liquidity shock. Finally, at t = 2, the
long-term project matures and patient depositors are paid.
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4.3 Bank Runs and the Role of the Government
We first turn to the issue of deriving the optimal deposit contract d = {d1, d2}.
Notice that the total amount of money left in banks at date 2 is (1−(1−γ)y−γd1)R,7
provided that the long-term project succeeds. Perfect competition implies that this
amount of money is totally transferred to type-2 depositors,8 therefore it must hold
that (1− γ)d2 = (1− (1− γ)y − γd1)R. The optimal deposit contract is then given
by
d2(y, d1) = max
{
0,
(
1− (1− γ)y − γd1
1− γ
)
R
}
.
At date 1 depositors update their beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule, so the expected
return of a patient depositor is pd2, where p = {pL, pH} is the posterior probability
of success for a given event s = {L,H}. At date 0, agents can also privately invest
their endowment in the long-term project, this means that banks can only attract
deposits by offering a sufficiently attractive contract. When agents do not invest
their endowment in the banking industry, there is a probability γ that they suffer
the liquidity loss X: liquidating the technology yields 1 but r > 1. On the other
hand, d1 = r + τ may not be enough to attract deposits. The reason is that if a
bank run occurs, then there is a positive probability that any patient depositor gets
only τ from the bank, these agents would then be worse off than privately investing
their endowment in the long-term technology. To ensure full participation, we thus
need that for a given type of government, the agent’s expected utility of depositing
the endowment at banks, WB(d1, τ), is equal or higher than the agent’s expected
utility of privately investing it in the long-term project, WNB(τ), where
WNB(τ) = γ(1− τ −X) + (1− γ)p0(1− τ)R + θτ . (4.1)
In what follows, we show that the optimal contract is d = (d1, d2) = (d2(τ , r + τ))
when X is large enough. First, notice that perfect competition implies that in
equilibrium banks maximize the agents’ expected utility. Let pi denote the prior
7Recall that γ impatient depositors withdraw d1 and (1− γ) patient depositors withdraw y to
pay taxes, thus the funds left in the long term investment at t=1 are (1− (1− γ)y − γd1).
8This is the standard debt contract whereby banks offer the total return of the long-term project
when it succeeds at maturity and the return from liquidating the bank’s assets when it does not
succeed (the latter return is zero in our model).
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probability of the event H,9 and consider the case i = M , we have that
WB(d1, 0)
∣∣
d1≥r = (1− pi)[γd1 + (1− γ)
(1− γd1)
(1− γ) p
LR] + pi[γd1 (4.2)
+(1− γ)pH (1− γd1)
(1− γ) R].
Moreover,
∂
∂d1
(
WB(d1, 0)
∣∣
d1≥r
)
= (1− pi)γ(1− pLR) + piγ(1− pHR) < 0.
Additionally, d1 > pd2, with p ∈ {pL, pH}, triggers a bank run,10 in such a case the
expected utility is always lower than WB(r, 0) since some depositors are not paid
and/or suffer the utility loss. Thus, in equilibrium banks will not offer d1 > r.
Suppose now that d1 is below r, i.e., d1 = r − ε, where r ≥ ε > 0. Then,
WB(d1, 0) can be written as
WB(d1, 0)
∣∣
d1<r
= (1− pi)[γ(r − ε−X) + (1− γ(r − ε))pLR]
+pi[γ(r − ε−X) + (1− γ(r − ε))pHR].
In this case impatient depositors always suffer the utility loss, then ∂
(
WB(d1, 0)
∣∣
d1<r
)
/∂ε >
0, since pHR > pLR > 1, thus d1 = 0 is optimal. As a result, under perfect com-
petition, banks offer d1 = r whenever W
B(r, 0) > WB(0, 0); this inequality holds if
the utility loss X is large enough so that
X > r[(1− pi)pLR + pipHR− 1].
Consider now the case i = K, i.e., τ = T . The higher the taxes, the less capital the
banks have to invest in the long-term project and hence the lower the expected return
of date 2 bank’s deposit contract. Agents face a clear trade-off. On the one hand,
higher taxes decrease the depositors’ expected utility due to its negative impact on
the banks’ expected return, but on the other hand they increase the consumers’
expected utility because of the consumption of public services. Moreover, as it will
be shown later, s = L triggers a bank run under the type-K government. Thus, we
have that
WB(d1, T )
∣∣
d1≥r+T = (1− pi) V
K
BR
∣∣
d1≥r+T + pi[γ(d1 − T ) (4.3)
+(1− γ)pH (1− γd1 − (1− γ)T )
(1− γ) R + θT ],
9Therefore, pi = Pr[H|R] ∗ p0 + Pr[H|0] ∗ (1− p0).
10Notice that the upper bound of d1 is given by γd1 ≤ 1− τ .
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where V KBR is the depositor’s expected utility when i = K and there is a bank run:
V KBR
∣∣
d1≥r+T = γ
[
(1− T )
d1 − T (d1 − T )−
(
1− (1− T )
d1 − T
)
X
]
+(1− γ)
[
1− T
d1 − T (d1 − T )
]
+ θT = (1− T )
(
1 +
γX
d1 − T
)
− γX + θT.
Here, (1 − T )/(d1 − T ) is the probability of being paid (d1 − T ) when a bank run
occurs. Notice that T has a threefold impact on the depositors’ expected utility.
Firstly, increasing T lowers the probability of being paid: ∂[(1− T )/r]/∂T = −1/r.
Secondly, an increase in T lowers the expected utility of type-1 depositors through
the liquidity loss: (γX); Thirdly, an increase in T has a positive impact on the
depositors’ expected utility since it raises the consumption of public services. We
have that
∂
∂d1
(
WB(d1, T )
∣∣
d1≥r+T
)
= piγ(1− pHR)− (1− pi)(1− T ) γX
(d1 − T )2 < 0.
Moreover, d1 > pd2, with p ∈ {pL, pH}, triggers a bank run, in which case the
expected utility is lower than WB(r + T, T ). Thus, in equilibrium banks will not
offer d1 > r + T . If d1 is below r + T , agents suffer the utility loss with probability
γ. Consider the contract d1 = r + T − ε, where r ≥ ε > 0, WB(d1, T ) is given by
WB(d1, T )
∣∣
d1<r+T
= (1− pi) V KBR
∣∣
d1<r+T
+ pi[γ(r − ε−X)
+pH(1− γ(r + T − ε)− (1− γ)T )R + θT ],
where
V KBR
∣∣
d1<r+T
= (1− T )− γX + θT.
Notice that ∂
(
WB(d1, T )
∣∣
d1<r+T
)
/∂ε > 0, thus d1 = 0 is optimal. Therefore, in
the presence of perfect competition, d1 = r+T wheneverW
B(r+T, T ) > WB(0, T ),
which is satisfied for a large enough X so that
X >
pir(pHR− 1)
(1− pi)(1− T )/r + pi .
In the presence of the type-M government, agents will deposit their endowment
at banks when WB(r, 0) > WNB(0). Using (4.2) and (4.1), we have that this
inequality is strictly satisfied when X is large enough so that
X >
1
γ
[
γ + (1− γ)p0R− γr − (1− γr)(pLR + pi(pH − pL)R
]
.
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Intuitively, if agents do not deposit their endowment at banks, then they will suffer
the disutility X with probability γ.
Similarly, under the type-K government, agents will deposit their endowment at
banks when WB(r + T, T ) > WNB(T ). Using (4.3) and (4.1), this inequality holds
if X is large enough so that
X >
1
γpi
[
γ(1− T ) + (1− γ)p0(1− T )R− (1− pi)(1− T )
(
1 +
γX
r
)
−pi(γr + pH(1− γr − T ))] .
Intuitively, if agents deposit their endowment at banks, then they will suffer the
disutility X with probability γ(1−pi) (i.e., agents must be impatient and also receive
the bad signal), whereas if they invest their endowment in the long-term project,
then they will suffer this disutility with a higher probability: γ.
Therefore, for a given τ ∈ {0, T} and a large enough X, the optimal deposit
contract is
d(τ) =
[
r + τ ,
(
1− (1− γ)τ − γ(r + τ)
1− γ
)
R
]
.
We need that
T < 1− γr,
so that d2(T ) > 0. The reason is that if T > 1−γr, then there is no investment in the
long-term project at t = 1 since the endowment is then used to pay taxes. Obviously,
d2(0) > d2(T ). Additionally, if d1 ≥ d2 held, then a bank run would always occur
since in such a case (patient and impatient) depositors would withdraw at date 1; to
exclude this trivial case we assume throughout that γ < ((1−T )R− (r+T ))/(rR−
(r + T )).
A type-2 depositor will not withdraw if pd2(τ) ≥ d1, or equivalently, if
p ≥ p̂(τ) = (1− γ)d1
(1− (1− γ)τ − γd1)R.
For simplicity of exposition we have assumed that the present value of the debt
is zero, but the government can always buy it at its face value.11 Notice that
p̂(T ) > p̂(0). We focus on the case p̂(T ) < pH for d1 = r + T . This means that
11Assuming that the debt has a positive present value will not change the qualitative results of
the model.
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independently of the government’s type, if the realization of s is H, then patient
consumers will not withdraw at date 1. Consequently, the observation of H rules
out the possibility of bank runs. Given this, if s = L, the economy will face three
possible states of nature: i) if pL < p̂(0) < p̂(T ), a bank run will occur whatever
the type of government; ii) if p̂(0) < pL < p̂(T ), a bank run will only occur in
the type-K government;12 iii) if p̂(0) < p̂(T ) < pL, a bank run will never occur
whatever the type of government. We are primarily interested in the second case,
which reflects a situation in which the economy is more sensitive to the observation
of a low profitability signal due to taxes. The reason is that in the presence of taxes
there is less money invested in the long-term project, and this in turn lowers its
expected return pd2(T ). From now on, we assume that this case holds.
13
In order to analyze which government policy will be preferred, we must compare
the expected utility of agents under the type-K and the type-M government. In par-
ticular, agents prefer the type-K government when ∆ = WB(r+T, T )−WB(r, 0) >
0. We have that ∂∆/∂θ = T > 0 and
∂∆
∂X
= γ(1− pi)
[
1− T
r
− 1
]
< 0.
Therefore, for a given X there exists a high enough θ so that raising taxes is socially
optimal. Instead, for a given θ there exists a large enough X so that raising taxes is
not socially optimal. Notice that the probability of being an impatient depositor and
receiving the bad signal has a clear impact on ∂∆/∂X: decreasing γ or increasing
pi, lowers the impact of X on ∆.
4.4 How to Stop a Run on Banks
Recall that when s = L, there is a bank run in the type-K but not in the type-
M government since p̂M < pL < p̂K . In such a case depositors prefer the type-M
government for X large enough or θ small enough. However, the type-K government
12If agents do not invest their endowment in the banking industry and observe s = L at date
1, they will not find it optimal to liquidate the technology when they are patient since pLR > 1.
Conversely, if they invest their endowment in the banking industry and observe s = L at date 1,
they will find it optimal to run on banks. Moreover, the banks will have to liquidate assets even if
by doing so they lose resources (investments with positive net present value, are liquidated).
13Notice that for any given d1 > 0 and d2 > 0, there exists a low enough pL so that pLd2 < d1.
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may resolve this banking crisis by means of different policies. Next, we analyze some
of them.
4.4.1 Liquidating the Public Asset
The type-K government may resolve the crisis by liquidating the public asset for
cash and injecting this money into the banking industry.14 The government can do
so by repurchasing the public debt owned by banks. Let δ denote the amount of
money that is necessary to inject into the banking industry so as to stop the bank run
and δ the maximum amount of money that can be liquidated from the public asset.
To stop a bank run the government should inject money into the banking system so
that r = pLd2(T ) + δ, which implies that patient depositors are indifferent between
withdrawing and not. The depositors’ utility is given by UK = d1 − T + θ(T − δ),
where d1 = r + T . Therefore, it is welfare improving to stop the bank run only if
V KBR
∣∣
d1=r+T
< UK = r + θ(T − δ), which holds if
δ < δ∗ ≡ r + γX − (1− T )(1 + γX/r)
θ
.
When δ is lower than δ∗, the utility loss of consuming less public services is offset
by the utility gain of having liquidity. Notice that δ∗ is decreasing in θ. The reason
is that the higher is θ, the higher will be the utility of consuming public services,
which makes liquidating public services more costly and consequently lowers δ∗.
Recall that the type-K government can stop the bank run only if δ∗ < δ, we have
the following:
Proposition 1 Suppose that p̂M < pL < p̂K and δ < δ∗ < δ, then if s = L and
the government raises taxes, a bank run is triggered; however, liquidating the public
asset to stop the run on the banks is welfare improving.
14By liquidating the public asset we mean modifying the direction of public funds before they
are spent but once they have been accepted in the public budget.
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4.4.2 Optimal government policies as functions of the tim-
ing and the information structure
From above we have that when δ < δ < δ∗ holds, the type-K government cannot
resolve the banking crisis even though it would be optimal to do so. In such a
case the government may have incentives to create a buffer or to gather information
about the realization of the signal before the agents receive it. Let us divide date 1
into the three consecutive subdates 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3; we may face two different cases
in terms of the timing: i) at subdate 1.1 the government raises taxes and at subdate
1.2 it anticipates the realization of the event s; ii) at subdate 1.1 the government
anticipates the realization of the event s and given this it may raise taxes at subdate
1.2. Finally, at subdate 1.3 agents receive the signal s.
Case i: creating a buffer
In this case the government can only anticipate the realization of the event after
having raised taxes, as a result at subdate 1.1 it may prefer to invest only a part of
the funds in the public services and store the rest of them as a buffer for a potential
financial crisis. Let B denote the necessary buffer size to stop the financial crisis,
then B = r−pLd2(T ), as a result the type-K government invests only T ′ = T −B in
the public service. We may also assume that when the government anticipates the
realization of the event H, it may reinvest B in the public service but at expense
of some cost λ.15 Here, the government faces the following trade-off: whether to
spend money in public services but to make the system more prone to shocks or to
spend less money in public services and to make the system more resilient to shocks.
More specifically, it is socially optimal to create the buffer as long as the agents’
expected utility of doing so is higher than the agents’ expected utility of investing
all the taxes in public services:
(1− pi)r + pi(γr + (1− γ)pHd2(T )) + θ(T ′ + piλB) ≥ (1− pi)V KBR
+ pi(γr + (1− γ)pHd2(T )) + θT
This last expression can be rewritten as follows:
(1− pi)(r − V KBR) ≥ θ[T − (T ′ + piλB)]
15For instance, consumers may prefer to consume the public services early.
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This condition says that creating the buffer B is socially optimal when the ex-
pected gain of stopping the bank run is higher than the expected utility loss of
consuming less public services. Therefore, the size of θ and λ are key in determining
whether the type-K government will prefer to invest all the funds in the public ser-
vices or not. More specifically, for given pi and λ there may exist a high enough θ so
that the government may prefer that financial crises occur with positive probability.
Case ii: a more informed government (taxes on financial transactions)
In this case at subdate 1.1 the government may anticipate that s = L, if so at
subdate 1.2 it can remove the taxes and allow for the possibility of an ex-post tax
raising, that is, at date 2.16 Notice that the project may not succeed, in such a case
taxes could not be charged and consequently public services will not be provided.
Moreover, agents prefer to consume the public services early (λ < 1). If the project
succeeds we have that τ = T2 taxes are collected at date 2, where T2 ≡ T/(1 − γ),
now fewer agents have to pay the whole amount of taxes. The agents’ expected
utility of raising taxes at t = 2 is
V K
∣∣
τ=T2
= γ(r + T ) + (1− γ)pL
[
R(1− γ(r + T ))− T
(1− γ)
]
+ θλpLT.
Suppose now that taxes are not charged (at any period), then there will not be
a banking crisis since p̂M < pL, thus the agents’ expected utility is given by
V K
∣∣
τ=0
= γ(r + T ) + pLR(1− γ(r + T )).
The question is whether it is optimal to charge taxes ex-post, and this is so when
i) patient depositors do not mimic impatient depositors, i.e., the expected return at
period 2 is higher than r + T :
pL
[R(1− γ(r + T ))− T ]
(1− γ) > r + T, (4.4)
16The possibility of raising taxes at t = 2, represents the case of taxing on withdrawals. Patient
depositors can profit from using delayed checks, which is a common use in Argentina (the so called
“cheques posdatados”) that is subject to taxes (while the use of debit cards is not). Additionally,
by law it is compulsory to use checks for payments higher than 1000 argentinean pesos, which is
higher than the basic consumption basket for Argentina.
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and ii) V K
∣∣
τ=T2
> V K
∣∣
τ=0
, or, equivalently,
pL[R(1− γ(r + T ))− T ] + λpLθT > pLR(1− γ(r + T )),
which boils down to
λθ > 1. (4.5)
Conversely, if λθ < 1, then it is optimal to provide no public services. The reason
is simple, the marginal utility of increasing taxes and consuming public services
is θ, whereas the marginal utility of consuming private goods is 1, so charging
taxes ex-post is only welfare improving as long as the discounted marginal utility of
consuming more public services, λθ, is higher than the marginal utility of consuming
less private goods.
4.4.3 A type-K government will never look like a type-M
government. A commitment problem.
So far, we have assumed that for a given government’s type, the government’s ob-
jective is to maximize the agents’ expected utility. However, as we have seen, if (4.5)
is not satisfied, then it is not optimal to raise taxes but to behave as the type-M
government so as to increase the patient depositors’ expected utility. Suppose that
(4.4) does not hold, then it follows a banking crisis and public services are not pro-
vided. In such a case, the type-K government may behave as if its type were M ,
because this behaviour would increase the expected welfare (given that in any case
public services cannot be provided). However, if the long-term project succeeds at
date 2, then this government may charge taxes and invest in public services (even
if this policy is not socially optimal) because it is the raison d’eˆtre or ‘reason to be’
of that kind of government. This means that ex-ante the type-K government will
never look like the type-M government; patient depositors will anticipate this com-
mitment problem and even if the type-K government does not announce at subdate
1.2 the possibility of ex-post taxes they will run on banks and trigger a banking crisis
whenever (4.4) does not hold. The ”reason to be” of the type-K government plus a
”bad profitability signal” are now the causes of this banking crisis. This will be the
case when the government has a bad history of commitment (weak institutions).
Notice that a bank run triggered by raising taxes at date 1 is quite different to
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a bank run triggered by taxes on financial transactions. In the latter case, public
services are not provided, while in the former case agents enjoy these services.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
A key finding of this paper is that a government who cares on providing public
services (through taxes) can generate banking crises. This is due to the scarcity of
funds and the competition for them between the government and the private sector.
Nevertheless, we showed that under certain conditions, governments can provide
public services while preventing banking crises. Additionally, we showed that such
governments might find it impossible to prevent a crisis if doing so goes against its
“moral” principles, which for the type-K government are here represented by its
investment decision in public services. Additionally, we studied the case of taxes
on financial transactions and showed that these taxes can prevent crises when the
government has superior information than banks and depositors.
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